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ABSTRACT
This thesis describes and analyzes the relationship between post-World War II
Soviet fighter aircraft design and Soviet air employment doctrine. It tests the
proposition that Soviet fighter aircraft are developed in response to design criteria
established solely on the basis of military requirements. The results shov^^ that Soviet
fighter design has not only progressed largely independently of prevailing doctrinal
requirements, but appears to have driven the "development of tactical air employment
doctrine over the past forty years.
THESIS DISCLAIMER
The views and judgments presented in this thesis are those solely of the author.
They do not necessarily reflect ofTicial positions held by the Naval Postgraduate
School, the Department of the Navy, the Air Force Institute of Technology, the
Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government
agency or organization. No citation of this work may include references or attributions
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I. INTRODUCTION
After Daedalus had crafted the wines upon which he and his son would escape to
safety, he save verv specific instructions to Icarus on how to use them to
maximum elTect. Daedalus warned Icarus not to fly too low. lest the wings
become damaged by the salt water sprav; nor should he fly too high, lest the sun
melt the wax tliat held the structures together .... Growing over-confident in his
new-found abilitv, the voung boy forgot his father's warnings and, oblivious to
the danaer, climbed high into the sun, where his wings disintegrated, and Icarus
perished'in the sea below.
A. PURPOSE
This thesis describes and analyzes the relationship between post-World War II
Soviet fighter aircraft design and Soviet tactical air employment doctrine (that
underlying body of principles that govern the operational use of tactical air assets). It
is widely held that weapons procurement derives rationally from pre-existing doctrinal
and operational requirements. Thus, th*^ evolution of weapons design should "track
with" the evolution of this tactical air employment doctrine. Further, not only should
this doctrine not demand more of the available systmes than they can deUver, it should
not fail to fully exploit available capability. This research effort tests the proposition
that Soviet fighter aircraft are developed in response to design criteria estabUshed solely
on the basis of miUtary requirements, as we understand them from available Soviet
writings. The results show that Soviet fighter design has progressed largely
independently of existing doctrinal requirements, and in fact, appears to have driven
the development of tactical air employment doctrine over the past forty years.
B. METHODOLOGY
The basic "method" of this research is to compare the most easily-observed
characteristics and performance figures for most Soviet fighter aircraft with the
employment concept prevalent at the time of each fighter's design. The data base from
which the information on Soviet fighter aircraft (hereafter referred to simply as
"fighters") is derived is one created by the author in late 1985 and early 1986. It
includes only aircraft designed at the MIG (the acronym for Mikoyan-Gurevich, the
names of the two designers who founded the design bureau) and SUKHOI (the
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abbreviation for which is "SU") design bureaus since 1945. Only those aircraft put into
serial production are included in the data base. This does, however, include some
aircraft produced in ver>' small numbers, such as the MIG-23 FLOGGER A.
The data were all derived from unclassified sources. Where the necessar\' data
were not available, the author derived them, either through simple "number-crunching"
(as was the case, for example, in determining thrust-to-weight ratios or wingloading
values) or through the use of simple linear regression (as in the case, for example, of
determining non-afterburning maximum thrust based on a regression of maximum
afterburning thrust, where the correlation coefficient was close to unity.^
C. ORGANIZATION
Although the thesis discusses the evolution of fighter design and the evolution of
air employment doctrine in the Soviet Union since the Second World War, Section II
provides necessary background information on the Soviet weapons procurement
process in general. It also ofiers some propositions about its systemic impact on
fighter design and doctrinal devlepment.
The chronological analysis of Soviet fighter development in Section III is
formatted the same way as the chronological analysis of doctrinal development
presented in Section IV. In each, the postwar period is divided into four parts: The
Stalinist Period (1945-1953); the Khrushchev Period (1954-1964); a "nuclear" period
(1964-1973), and; a "conventional" period (1973-1985). Taken together, these two
sections argue that the evolution of Soviet fighter technology has largely driven Soviet
air employment doctrine over the past forty years.
Section V atempts to quantify the problem, presenting the results of both factor
and multiple-attribute utility analyses. The factor analysis follows from the assumption
that the technological level of fighter capability can be viewed as a "combination of its
^The chief designer of the MIG design bureau (OKB) is currently R. A.
Belyakov. Althoueh ifhad been customary to honor a designer's successfuUv-produced
product with the Tirst two or three letters of the designers name (e.g., MItj-15 for
Mikoyan and Gurevich, SU-7 for Sukhoi, TU-16 for Tupolev) the prac^tice followed in
this thesis, as it appears to be in the Soviet Union, is to credit the OKB itself, rather
than the particular designer. Thus, an aircraft recentlv designed by Belvakov will be
referred to as a "MIG""'product and bears the "M I G'^ designation. Siniilarlv for the
Sukhoi OKB, where the chief designer is currently E. A." Ivanov; products of the
Sukhoi OKB bear the designation "'SU," even where they may have been designed
under Ivanov's tenure.
Mhe sources for the data base were Modern Air Combat (1983). Aircraft of the
Soviet Union (1983)^^ and An Illustrated Guide to Future Fighters and Combat Aircraft
(1984) [all by Bill Gunstonl, as well as Janes All the World's Aircraft, Aviation Week
and Space Technology, and Interavia.
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component capabilities, each of which can be measured at an interval level." The
model derived from the multiple-attribute utility analysis is specifically designed to
emphasize the growth in particular capabilities of difierent aircraft over a long period
of time, as well as to permit a quasi-mathematical calculation of the relationship
between doctrine and technology in the postwar period.
The final portion of the thesis (Section VI) considers a variety of factors external
to the intrinsic characteristics of the aircraft itself-pilot skill, initiative, and tactics-in
an effort to ground the quantitative portion of this research in a larger context.
"Allan Wesley LeGrow,_ Measuring Aircraft Capabililv for Military and Political
Anah>sis (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June
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II. THE SOVIET WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS
It is practically a cliche to identify the Soviet Union as a superpower primarily, if
not solely, because of its military prowess. Numerous scholars have commented on the
"backwardness" that characterizes the overall Soviet economy. At the same time,
however, the Soviet Union clearly has a capacity to produce weapons of a sufficiently
capable quality and in vast enough numbers to "qualify" as one of the world's two
superpowers. The discrepancy between the civilian and mihtary sectors of the Soviet
economy appear to be so great that one is tempted to conjure up an image of two
distinct economies; one that produces sophisticated military hardware roughly
comparable to Western equipment, and another one that produces consumer goods
only erratically and at all times of a significantly inferior quality, compared both to
their Western counterparts and to the higher-quality workmanship found in and
priority attached to items produced in the military sector.
This section of the thesis describes, in general terms, how the Soviet political and
military leadership acquires weapon systems. It will be shown, in particular, that the
Soviets are able to acquire weapons of high quality and in enormous number in the
midst of an economy riddled with waste, inefficiency, and built-in impediments to
innovation, at the same time as the process imposes certain costs on the design system.
A. THE PARTICIPANTS
1. The Politburo
Military policy in general, and weapons acquisition in particular, take place
within a dual government-Party structure. For the most part, the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU), specifically the Politburo and the Secretariat, formulate
policy, while the governmental apparatus ratifies and implements those decisions.
Within the CPSU, the Politburo is the most important organization involved in the
Soviet weapons acquisition process. The Politburo both regularly participates in
defense- oriented decisionmaking and retains the power to initiate, cancel or modify
programs that capture its interest.^
The Politburo considers all "large, non-recurrins expenditures," budsets,
numbers of weapons, and programs "with cost-overrlins. Arthur Alexander,




The Politburo's intervention has been significant in the past; it is well-known
that Stalin was personally involved in the .weapons acquisition process, particularly
involving nuclear weapons. Khrushchev, too, was intimately involved in the efTort to
develop the Soviet space program and ballistic missiles. Currently, the extent of the
Politburo's involvement may range from minimal to maximal. This latter type of
activity is most likely for "new in principle" weapons, examples of which are nuclear
weapons, ballistic missiles, and directed-energy "beam" weapons.^ However, while
devolution of authority to the working level has been described as one of the major
characteristics of the Brezhnev era,^ it remains to be seen what will be said of the
Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev regimes. •
2. The Secretariat
Another important CPSU organization is the Central Committee Secretariat.
In addition to its other functions, it is responsible for overseeing policy
implementation. There are approximately ten Secretaries, each with specific areas of
responsibility. One of these is probably charged with overseeing heavy industry and
defense production. This ver>' powerful post was once held by Leonid Brezhnev, and
later by Dmitri Ustinov, who became the Minister of Defense in 1976. Subordinate to
this Secretary is the Department of Defense Industry, which
is responsible for overseeing Party affairs in the militarv-production ministries,
and also for the implenaentation of weapons research aria development (R&D)
and production policies.
3. The Defense Council
Although the CPSU formulates and implements defense policy,
recommendations as to what policy should be in the first place probably come from the
Defense Council. This organization "links politicians and the military at the highest
level."* A great deal of secrecy surrounds the Defense Council, both with respect to its
^Alexander, Decision-Making, pp. 35-39.
^Jerry Houeh, "The Brezhnev Era: The Man and the Svstem," Problems of
Communism Marcn-April 1976.
"^"The Secretary- for Defense Production, and perhaps also his subordinate
department, are said to be a link between the political and military- leadership."
Kenneth A. Myers and Dmitri Simes. Soviet Decisionmaking, Strategic Policy, and
^/lLr(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown
University, 1974^), ACDA/PAB-243, p. 26. ' £P-
^Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 14.
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membership and to its precise functions. Alexander says that the Defense Council is
primarily concerned with major weapons developments and procurement
pro2ranimeSj manpower levels, and budget allocations. In line with its budaetarv
responsibilities, the Defence Council provides the guidelines at the beginnmg of
the planning process and would make recomiiiendations to the Politburo
regarding the final plans of the Minister of Defence and militarfVrproduction
mmistries .... the Defence Council approves weapons programmes.
He concludes that the Defense Council is probably the most important political
policy-making body for weapons procurement in the Soviet Union.
4. The Ministr}' of Defense
Another key participant in the acquisition process is the Ministry of Defense,
under which are included centralized ministerial organs, the General Staff, and the five
"services." The central Ministry' organs provide the initial guidance and control for
weapons development and production. The separation of functions between the
Ministry "proper" and the General Staff provides a system of "checks and balances."^
^
The General Staff itself also plays an important role. All requests for new systems flow
through the General Staff and it adjudicates inter-service disputes over resource
allocations. It is also possible that the General Staff or one of its directorates serves as
the operational stafi' of the Defense Council, advising it and making recommendations
to it. Because the General Staff is the main repository of professional militarv'
expertise, its influence on the weapons acquisition process can be substantial.
Vernon Aspaturian has suggested that there is no statutory' composition on the
Defense Council, 'that its membership can be expanded or contracted depending upon
circumstances." He further suggests that the XTouncil's full members may "be the
General Secretarv. the Chairmah^of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Second
Secretary, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Defense, the
Chairma'n of the KGB. and the Vlinister of Foreign AlTairs. Advisor\' members include
the Chairman of the Militar>'-Industrial Commission (VPK), the Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces, the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces, a
First Deputy Defense Minister without portfolio, and the Director of the Main
Political Adriiinistration (NPS lecture, 13 August 1985).
^^Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 15.
^^This separation of functions would provide the Minister with an independent
check on General Staff planning and activities. Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 17.
The planning cycle establishes a calendar for resource allocation, which represents a
rigidity in the intra-plan period. Even with high priority military' production, some
"newly-determined" priorities cannot be reflected until the nex"^! Five Year Plan.
Vernon Aspaturian, The Soviet MiUtarv-Industrial Complex-Does It Exist?" Journal
of International Affairs vol. 26, no. 1, 1972, p. 26.
The Staffs control of military information permits it to exert significant
influence on national military policy' bv presenting issues and options to major
decisionmaking forums in ways which 'favor preferred outcomes." Ellen Jones,
"Defense R&D Policymaking in the USSR," in Jiri Valenta and William Potter, eds.,
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Finally, within the Ministr>' of Defense there are'also the five services. Most
of the requests for new weapons, and the number of systems required, come from the
services. Each service directs some weapons development and each is responsible for
the oversight required at factories, research institutes, and design bureaus. Requests
for new or improved weapons from within the servies could come from the various
scientific-technical committees (which would be alert to new technological possibilities),
the operations staff (which would be sensitive to mission requirements), or the field
commanders (who would promote even more applications-oriented requirements).^'^
Within each service there is a Deputy Commander in Chief for Armaments, whose
functions include
specification of 'tactical-technical requirements' for new weapons svstems;
representation on the state acceptance commissions which evaluate new 'designs
and prototypes: and administration of .the teams of militarv representatives
(voenpredy)' at defense production plants.
These organizations, which are the services' main technical directorates, are "[the]
primar\' interface between the MOD [Ministry of Defense] consumer and the
developer/producer [of new weapons systems]. "^^
5. The Defense Industry
On the purely economic side of the house, implementation of defense policy is
the responsibility of the governmental administrative apparatus-the Council of
Ministers. The State Planning Commission (GOSPLAN), which operates under the
Council of Ministers, coordinates the thousands of organizations producing all the
products throughout the economy, including those needed in the defense sector.
Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security (Los Aneeles: Center for International and
Strategic Affairs, University of California, 1984), p. r25.
^^Jones, "Defense R&D," p. 125.
Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 19. The orientation or bias of requirements
would thus seem to be partlv determined bv their oriains: as one moves from the
scientific-technical committees' to armaments' directorates to operations stafi' to field
commands, one would expect a shift from technical to mission infiuence.
John A. McDonnell, "The Soviet Weapons Acquisition System." in Soviet
Armed Forces Review Annual vol. 3 (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1979),
^^Jones, "Defense R&D," p. 125.
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Military production, however, is administratively segregated from civilian production.^'''
The defense industrial sector consists of nine main ministries: four weapons production
ministries, and five component production ministries. ^^ Among these ministries, the
one that is responsible for the design, development, and production of all aerodynamic
systems is the Ministrv* of Aviation Industry' (MAP).
6. The Ministry' of Aviation Ministry (MAP)
The MAP, like most of the other industrial ministries, plans, controls, and
oversees the operation of research institutes, design bureaus, and production plants.
Its organization structure is typical of most defense industrv' ministries.^^ The scientific
research institutes (Nil) of the defense industry carry out both basic and applied
research.^^ Most research projects are financed from the state budget allocated to the
MAP, but there are also some external contractual agreements with other ministries
and organizations. The Nil's play a critical role in the design of new weapon systems
through the compilation of their research and test results into handbooks, which are
then distributed to the design community. These handbooks contain material,
structural, and procedural specifications for all approved aerodynamic systems and
components. The results of the Nil research are made available because many of the
design bureaus do not have the stafi' or facilities to carry out their own research. The
publication of handbooks for designers was instituted to establish common, proven
technical guidelines and keep designers abreast of new developments.^^
The military plan is sent separately to production facilities, which must satisfy
its goals as a first priority. Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 20.
^^The "weapons production" ministries are the Ministry of Aviation Industry
{aircraft, engines, parts, air-breathing missiles), Ministrv ' of Defense Industr\'
{conventional weapons), Ministrv' of Shipbuilding Industry {ships and submarines), and;
Ministrv of General Machine' Building (^rt/Zm/c missiles). Among the "component
production" ministries are the Ministrv of Electronics Industrv {electronic components),
Ministr>' of Radio Industry {electronic products), Ministrv' of Medium Machine Building
{nuclear weapons), Ministr)' of Machine Building {ammunition), and; Ministrv of the
Means of Communication [communications equipment). Alexander, Decision- \raking, p.
^^Anton Dobler, "The Soviet Aviation Industry," Paul Murphy, ed.. The Soviet
Air Forces (Jefierson: McFarland & Company, 1984), p. 81.
^^Work in the research institutes includes aerodynamic and structure research
primarily in support of the aircraft design bureaus, engfne research and testing for the
propulsion desien bureaus, and applied research on metallic materials. Dobler, "Soviet
Aviation Industry-," p. 84.
^^ McDonnell, "Soviet Weapons Acquisition," p. 181.
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This arrangement of keeping applied research separate from design and
development has several mixed consequences. On the one hand, it means that funding
for applied research does not depend on specific v^'eapons requirements. Also, there is
a strong institutional tendency towards commonality of parts, which has a desirable
effect on such things as ease of maintenance and sustainability. On the other hand,
while it is true that designers typically take what is available from the research
institutes, rather than "gold-plating" new systems, it also means that there is little or no
apparent incentive to incorporate new technologies.^^
The design bureaus (OKB's) are the' "managers" of the acquisition process.
Because they are located "at the central node between research and product, user and
planner," they supply the leadership and coordination necessar>' in the chaotic
processes of an unresponsive economy. ^^ An especially important part of the design
criteria is "producibility." This means that the designer must work closely with the
production plant and make sure that the design he is proposing does not draw upon
hard-to-get resources or components, or exceed the technological capability of the
production plant. The chief designer of the 0KB has a great deal more autonomy in
running his organization than most managers enjoy elsewhere in the Soviet economy
and is personally associated with the success or failure of his project. As an
illustration, the products (that is, the aircraft) have come to be identified by the first
two or three letters of the designer's name: MIG-25 (Mikoyan and Gurevich), SU-24
(Sukhoi), TU-22M (Tupolev). This practice is still followed and reflects the prestige
that redounds to successful designers.""^
Even with all the administrative positions, research institutes and design
bureaus, the bulk of resources comprising the Soviet aviation industry' are the series
This does not means that there is no innovation or technolosical development
present-only that it has not manifested itself clearlv to Western obs^ervers. It will be
shown later that, not onlv is there reason to be cautious about the notion of "Soviet
design heredity," but there has in fact been significant technological advancement in
the fighter design community.
^'Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 24.
^"^McDonnell, "Soviet Weapons Acquisition," p. 182.
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production plants. The locations of some of these plants are shown in Figure 1. These
series production plants tr>- to be as self- sufficient as possible, due to the problems in
supply characteristic of the Soviet economy. Nevertheless, there are a number of other
plants involved in the production of components, even if the subcontracting base is not
nearly as extensive in the USSR as it is in the US.
Source: Dobler, "Soviet Aviation Industry," p. 90.
A -AIRCRAFT
E - ENGINE
Figure 1. Location of Soviet Aircraft and Aircraft Engine Plants
In the same way that OKB's tend to specialize by aircraft type, so too do the
production plants try to specialize (bombers, transports, fighters, helicopters). Once a
design has been selected, the factory responsible for series production is "subordinated"
to the originating design bureau. The 0KB dispatches teams to help the factory "tool
up" and to oversee production in other ways.
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So long as production continues, the [desisn bureau] retains the authority to
monitor manufacturing techniques to ensure that the inteeritv of the design is' not
violated. In this they are both supported and cross-cliecl^ed bv the military'
representatives [voenpredy] who exercise qualitv control and certifv that
production is acceptable [to the Ministrv of Defense and the Air Force]. Because
of the evolutionary nature of Soviet weapons desian, it is not uncommon for a
given factorv to produce several venerations of a particular svstem . . . desianed
y the same'[OKK]. Thus, a tradition may develop . . . [that leads] to an aliiiost
permanent relationship .... it is reasonable to suspect that factory managers
prefer, other thinss beine equal, to retain [,0KB] 'bosses' with whom they have
built up a satisfactory working relationship.'
In addition to long familiarity with each other, the lengthy tenures of military
industrial managers, designers, and government administrators, has helped to create a
community of shared interests and values that -induces "a strong sense of the value of
continuity in design and production."^^
In this environment, things are less competed for than they are "arranged."
Weapons tend to be developed along very clearly established lines, and assignments
tend to be fixed by tradition, especially where technologies are stable. In the event of
entirely new systems or advanced technology, there may be multiple prototypes and a
side-by side competition to select a design for series production.
While in the past, the primary measure of success in military production was
quantitative, in recent years the emphasis has increasingly been on qualitative
improvements, especially with regard to the application of new technology.^^ Through
modernization, expansion, and mechanization, as well as higher wages and
non-pecuniary compensatory incentives such as housing, the Soviet aviation industr\' is
now on a par with Western aircraft industries in many areas. -^^ As mentioned briefly
^'McDonnell, "Soviet Weapons Acquisition," pp. 183-184.
^^Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 23.
^General Secretary Brezhnev named the 1976 Five Year Plan the "Plan of
Quality." Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 60.
"In the areas of forging, extrusion, metal removal, and metal joinine,
developments and applications are generally on a level with those of the West. Within
selected catesories of these fields-includina forging and extrusion press construction,
electro-discharge and ultrasonic machining^ slue-welding, electro-slag welding, pulsed
arc and magnetic arc welding-Soviet technofogy is advanced. HeavT presses used in
aircraft conlitruction include the world's largest forging press (70,01)0 metric ton
capacity) and a 20,000 metric ton capacity extrusion press. Emptiasis is now being
given both to improving the fabrication of aircraft structures from conventional
materials and to advancing the state of the art in high-temperature materials
fabrication and in the construction of lightweight structures. In some areas where
technology lags behind Western countrfes. e.g.. in advanced computer-comtrolled
machine tools and equipment process controls, foreign equipment has been purchased
[or stolen] to fill existing gaps or to stimulate inaigenous development.' Dobler,
Soviet Aviation Industry, p. 93.
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earlier, and in addition to the quality control function exercised at the production
plants by the OKB, the main technical directorates of the services also dispatch to the
factor>' teams of observers. These are the military representatives (voenpredy), whose
functions are also of a quality control nature. The close involvement of the military'
representatives is intended to elicit a measure of producer responsivenes.s quite
uncommon elsewhere in the Soviet economy. "This . . . [presence] helps explain the
remarkable contrast between the level of Soviet military and civilian technology. "^^
7. The Military-Industrial Commission (VPK)
Finally, there is one last organization which plays a very important role in
Soviet weapons acquisition: the MiUtar\'- Industrial Commission (VPK). In fact, the
VPK is widely held to be the single most powerful and important organization involved
in defense production. HoUoway suggests that the VPK may be an executive arm of
the Defense Council,-° while Alexander states that it may be answerable to the
Secretary for Defense Production of the Central Committee. ^^ Regardless, the VPK is
made up of the top executives of the key defense manufacturing industries and
coordinates the development of all Soviet weapons, as well as the acquisition of
Western technology. A recent US Department of Defense report characterizes the
VPK
as the expediter for weapons development projects .... [It] is the principal
Soviet militar\' instrument for eliminating .qr circumventing the inefficiencies
characteristic of the Soviet economic system.
B. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Thus, the Soviet military economic sector in general, and the weapons acquisition
process in particular, does indeed differ in significant ways from the civilian sector of
the economy. For example, in the military sector, the "customer" (i.e., the Ministr\' of
Defense) plays a dominant role. This is in sharp contrast to the typical
producer-customer relationship in the civilian sector, in which the buyer is truly at the
^^Jones, "Defense R&D," p. 126.
^^David HoUoway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1983), p. 111.
^^ Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 21.
Soviet Acquisition of Militarilv-Significant Western Technology: An Update
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1985), p. 4.
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mercy of the producer. There are at least two ways in which this "dominance" by the
buyer is reflected. The first, and probably the most important, is the system of priority
associated with military' production. In the absence of an automatically-functioning
market mechanism, such as prices that reflect cost, all criteria for military production
must be bureaucratically determined. The determination to accord priority to one or
another program is sufficient to transfer scarce resources to the military sector without
bidding up their prices. The tendency for these scarce resources to flow in the militar>'
production sector of the Soviet economy means that there is no immediate market
penalty (higher prices), however, it also means that Soviet costing for defense typically
understates capital input. ^'^
A second way in which the buyer-producer relationship is reversed from its
"normal" Soviet quality is that there is a highly-structured system of controls, enabling
the "customer" to exercise a kind of "oversight" with respect to the quality of the
system under production. In fact, "the military customer is given the right to reject
production which does not meet its standards." There are a variety of means and
instruments by which this quality control is assured. These include ver>' specific
wTitten requirements concerning the minimal operational capabilities the new system of
to possess, a willingness to budget vast research and procurement expenditures, a
formal assignment to design and production facilities of military officers with wide
responsibility for ensuring quality control, and a healthy disregard for the niceties of
procedure, which allows the political leadership to intervene an^rwhere in the process
when required. The defense sector's relationship to the civilian sector in the Soviet
economy has been characterized as an island of excellence in a sea of mediocrity.
Nevertheless, despite these differences between the two sectors, the military
sector does share certain characteristics witht the rest of the Soviet economy. It is,
after all, a centrally-planned, socialist organization in which production is allocated via
non-economic means. That is, production is determined by political preference, rather
than "through the market." As in other parts of the Soviet economy, the defense
McDonnell, "Soviet Weapons Acquisition," p. 175.
.This argument is not true across the board: for example, in manv cases, wages
are higher in the defense-oriented industries, precisely in to attract "scarce" engineering
talent^and skilled labor. For the most part, noweve'r, if resources are needed to fulfill
militar>' production requirements, it is sufTicient to put the full weieht of the political
structure behind the lev\-"no economic "incentive" is needed where" political power is
unitar>' and all-encompassing.
35McDonnell, "Soviet Weapons Acquisition," p. 175.
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sector must live with the optimistic planning targets that often create shortages of
necessar>' resources. This outright lack, due to administratively-mandated quantitative
allocations, means that resources on hand are not fungible; "a simple money budget is
not adequate to guarantee the availability of resources that have not been planned and
allocated in detail."-'^ Unreliable supplies engender an environment in which producers
are reluctant to innovate with regard to finding new suppliers and new components.
The lack of competition generates no incentives to dilTerentiate products. This state of
afiairs in the military production production sector, as in the civilian sector, results in a
strong tendency toward conservatism in both product design and development
processes. The "risk-avoidance" characteristic of the Soviet society as a whole also has
important consequences for the Soviets' ability to integrate and make full use of new
technology. This systemic weakness will be addressed in greater detail later in this
thesis.
Another characteristic of the military sector found as well in the civilian part of
the economy is a result of the supply problem endemic to Soviet industry-that is the
pursuit of autarky by ministries, through the vertical integration of important supply
industries. This is quite common in the defense industry, but especially so in the
Ministry of Aviation Industry, in which
90 to 95 percent of all aviation production (airframes, aeroengines, instruments,
avionics)-, -[is] concentrated in the enterprises of the Ministry of Aviation
Industry.''
It is not clear whether the "priority system" allows vertical integration to take place in
order to offset systemic problems, or is so wholly ineffective that the defense industry
must evolve that way in order to survive.
Overall, the Soviet bureaucratic environment appears optimized to meet the
special needs of the Soviet weapons acquisition process. It has taken advantage of the
strengths and avoided many of the weaknesses of the Soviet technical and industrial
base. Specifically, the organizational structure tends to develop technically-mature
^^Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 30.
HoUoway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race,
-p. 119.
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weapons systems and avoids the typical sloppiness of Soviet civilian production. In
addition, the Soviets are sometimes able to streamline an otherwise inflexible process to
accommodate what is new and technically challenging.
Nevertheless, a significant weakness in the Soviet system is the general lack of
incentives for technological advances or innovation, either in the weapons being
produced or the production processes themselves. With production quotas and
responsibilities determined by government fiat, there is no spur to use the technology
to increase product differentiation. The strongest preference by far, on the part of
both designers and producers, is to supply systems that emphasize continuity with
earlier, sanctioned practices and capabilities.
When technological advances do occur, they are likely to be oriented toward one
application and to be ill-integrated into or non-existent in other areas. For example, a
new machine tool designed for a particular purpose on the assembly line is unlikely to
be incorporated into any process other than that for which it was specifically designed,
bought or stolen. In the case of Soviet fighter aircraft, this means that while
technological advances do occur, they do so erratically and unevenly-their benefits
accrue to one type of aircraft at a time, rather than raising the overall capability of the
Soviet fighter force, or even the design and production community as a whole. Section
III will address the precise nature of these technological improvements in Soviet fighter
aircraft over the past forty years, with a view to laying the groundwork for a close look
at the evolution of Soviet air employment doctrine in Section IV.
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET FIGHTER DESIGN
A. 1945-1953, THE GERMAN LEGACY
The development of postwar Soviet fighters has its roots, more than an\-\vhere
else, in German design and production facihties. Because of British and American
strategic bombing, the German aircraft industry' was concentrated in the eastern part of
Germany. When the Soviet Army swarmed into Germany at the end of the war,
approximately 80% of Germany's aircraft industry fell into Soviet hands (see Figure 2,
next page). Production facilities all over eastern Europe were seized by the Soviets. In
Czechoslovakia, operational Messerschmitt-262 aircraft were captured, as well as
several types of jet aircraft engines. ^^ Entire factories were dissassembled and removed
to the Soviet Union (see Figure 3, page 27).
The Soviets also seized numerous precision tools, instruments, machine tools, and
facilities for their production. In addition to all the above-Hsted material resources, the
Soviets captured a number of important people in the German design community.
These included Dr. Gunther Brock (in charge of the German experimental aeronautics
institute, Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fur Luftfahrt in Berlin), Rudolph Rental
(Messerschmitt's project engineer for the ME-163 and ME-263), Dr. Adolph Betz
(Germany's foremost authority on swept-wing aircraft), and Siegfried Gunther (a senior
designer at Heinkei). In addition to these, some German estimates as to the total
number of people taken from Germany to the Soviet Union run as high as 300,000,
including production workers. ^^
These assets "paid off' for the Soviets because very soon after the war, Soviet
design bureaus began to produce new fighter designs incorporating the technologies
captured in Germany and making use of production facilities removed to the Soviet
Union. Of particular significance, many designs began to incorporate swept wings.
The Germans' operational ME-262 jet fighter had only a slight sweepback
Amon» them were: the Walter 4,400 lb. thrust rocket engine, which powered
the ME-163; the blueprints for the S-011, an advanced Heinkei jet'engine: and samples
of Bayerische Motoren Werke's BMW 003 coaxial turbojet, which would in time power
some of the first Soviet jet fighters. Asher Lee, Tne Soviet Air Force (London:
Duckworth, 1961), p. 73.
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Figure 2. Location of German Aircraft Engine Plants, 1945
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Figure 3. Dispositon of Main German Aircraft Engine Plants
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(approximately 15 degrees), but there had been experimental prototypes with
fully-swept wings.
The MIG-15, which is the first aircraft in this thesis' data base, appears to have
been based on German data compiled for the sweptback version of the
Messerschmitt-262. The original aircraft was designed in 1946. That same year, the
Soviets purchased 55 Rolls-Royce centrifugal compressor-type turbojet engines from
the British. These engines were better suited to Soviet production methods; they were
simpler than the German axial flow designs the Soviets had until then been attempting
to copy.'^^ In 1956, USAF General Nathan Twining toured the Moscow plant in which
the Soviet copy of the Rolls-Royce engine was produced and noted that it was equiped
with machine tools from several western countries, including the United States. The
new British powerplants available to the Soviets, as well as the benefit of German wind
tunnel test data on swept-wing designs, enabled the MIG-15 to approach the "sound
barrier."
Even so, the Soviets, like others trying to increase flight speeds, experienced
problems in the transonic region. This is a categor>' of flight speeds in which the
airflow around the aircraft is partly subsonic and partly supersonic (.7 Mach to Mach
1.3). Airflow velocity above the wing's surface is always greater than the aircraft's
flight speed. When the flight Mach number increases, so do the local velocities at the
thickest part of the wing. At some point, usually around .7 Mach, the local maximum
velocity reaches Mach unity (Mach 1.0). The flight Mach number at that point is
called the critical Mach number.
At free-stream air speeds above the critical Mach number, a number of
undesirable flight characteristics develop, such as local shock waves on the wing
surface. At slightly higher speeds, one encounters the drag-rise Mach number (or force
divergence Mach number), at which the drag coefficient increases, the lift coefTicient
decreases, and there are unwelcome changes in the pitching moment coefficient. These
characteristics of transonic flight cause local stall situations on the wings, leading to
uncontrolled rolling. They also contribute to "tuckunder," in which the nose has a
tendency to pitch down. The shock wave produced by supersonic flight can also cause
buffeting, usually caused by turbulent air flowing around the horizontal stabilizers.
'^'^Sutton, Western Technology, p. 264.
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2 July 1956, p. 29.
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Yet another difficulty encountered in this region is "buzz;" the rapid oscillation of
control surfaces. Buzz causes early metal fatigue and difficulty in using non-powered
control mechanisms. These are the sorts of problems the Soviets encountered with the
MIG-15. It had many faults, including a
serious tendency to stall [and] spin in tight turnfs], poor behavior at any high
ansle of attack, [even low speed' and, progressively worse buzz and snakmg as
[the] Mach number rose beyond 0.88.
These deficiencies can be overcome, or at least ameliorated, by a variety of
measures. Clearly, the problem is one of getting the critical Mach number and the
drag-rise Mach number up as high as possible for a given free-stream airspeed. This
can be done by decreasing the wing's thickness (measured by the thickness/chord
ratio), or increasing the wing sweep (which has the effect of decreasing the aspect
ratio). Each of these has advantages and disadvantages. The choice depends,
theoretically, on the mission requirements of the aircraft being designed.
Both sweeping the wings and reducing the thickness/chord ratio will delay the
onset of the critical Mach number and the drag-rise Mach number. In both cases,
however, the lift coefficient will also fall. The lower lifting ability of the wing is likely,
all other things being equal, to require higher takeoff and landing speeds, which entail
a longer ground run and longer runways. This is a significant consideration if a force
planner wants to use aircraft "at the front;" that is, at makeshift airfields and landing
strips close behind the leading edge of the combat area. Increasing the wing sweep
also increases induced drag and can pose stability problems. Decreasing the airfoil
thickness poses structural problems and actually results in a heavier wing than would
be the case if it were thicker. Finally, because the wing normally has a considerable
amount of usable volume, decreasing its thickness will reduce fuel-carrying capacity, in
turn affecting the combat radius of the aircraft.
Clearly a designer faces a number of compromises and tradeoffs in the
determination of these characteristics. The evolution of these characteristics in the
aircraft designed at the MIG OKB from 1945-1953 represent a clear intention to
pursue higher flight speeds, seemingly regardless of the impact on other flight
characteristics. Figure 4 (next page) shows the evolution of thickness/chord ratio from
"^^Bill Gunston, Aircraft of the Soviet Union (London: Osprey Publishine. 1983).
p. 175.
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1945-1953. As the MIG 0KB moved from one airframe design to the next (MIG-15 to
MIG-17 to MIG-19), it progressively decreased the thickness; chord ratio. Internal fuel
tankage decreased only slightly, however, due most likely to the fact that each new
design was longer than its predecessor. Combat radius did not suffer because new
iterations of powerplants were increasingly efficient (see Figure 5, next page).
Maximum thrust also increased, incorporating for the first time an afterburner in the
MIG-17 FRESCO C (Figure 6, page 31). The drop in the ground run for the MIG-19
series reflects the replacement of the VK-IF powerplant with two new RD-9 series
engines (Figure 7, page 32). Wingsweep was increased by ten degrees each successive
series (Figure 8, page 32). The slope of the line describing wingsweep is the inverse of
the slope of the line describing aspect ratio, which is to be expected (see Figure 9, page
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Figure 9. Evolution of Aspect Ratio (1945-1953)
The significant design changes of the 1945-1953 period are generally associated
with the wing: increasing its sweep angle, making it thinner, and decreasing the aspect
ratio. These changes were aimed at making the aircraft fly at higher speeds. Figure 10
(next page) aggregates the most interesting of these characteristics in their evolution.
The right lower rear corner of the box represents characteristics of low, slow flight.
The left upper front corner was clearly the goal from 1945-1953.
This is an interesting depiction because the evolution of design in 1945-1953 runs
counter to the avowed Soviet employment concept for aircraft in that time period
(about which more later). Stalin's "five permanent operating principles" emphasized
the World War Il-type of operation as being the model for any future conflict. Soviet
air assets in WW II were used almost exclusively in support of ground operations. The
vast majority of sorties were of the ground-attack type; targets were on the battlefield
or located closely beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). Aircraft were
deployed close to the front, where they would be better able to respond on short notice
to tasking from the combined arms commander.
12.2
fiSPZCT
Figure 10. The Trend Toward Supersonic Flight
One of the requirements for ground support aircraft is that the pilot should be
able to find his targets; in particular this means that it should be possible to distinguish
friendly from enemy forces; This is very hard to do at high speed or high altitude. The
ideal platform for ground attack missions is one that is low and slow. This
combination of characteristics allows the pilot to acquire his targets and eases the
problems of coordination between forward air controllers (FACs) and ground attack
aircraft.
This is clearly not the trend of aircraft design in the Stalinist period. It is clear
that the MIG 0KB was designing air defense fighters that could fly higher and faster
throughout the 1945-1953 period. It was in the areas of swept wings and afterburning
turbojets that the biggest technological advances were being made in the period. It
seems reasonable, therefore, to advance the proposition that despite the avowed
employment concept for Soviet air forces in the immediate postwar period, the
newly-available German technology found its way into applications not previously
demanded by doctrinal requirements.
B. 1954-1964, A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS
Around 1953-1954, the MIG 0KB developed the basic concept for the
MIG-21-FISHBED. Gunston says that stipulated features included ability to carr\'
34
limited all-weather radar and AAMs with secondary guns and bombs, to operate under
RSIU (Markham) secure ground control, and to have highest possible flight .... range
was discoimted."^ The MIG-21 was developed with two difTerent wing planforms-one
was a swept-wing identical to the MIG-19 and the other was a pure delta wing, which
was the design MIG later adopted. The MIG-2rs thinner wing section, sharper
leading edge, and smaller aspect ratio continued the trend established 1945-1953 toward
aircraft with higher flight speeds (see Figures 11 and 12, next page).
This evolution naturally led to a delta wing."^** The FISHBED'S wing design,
combined with a newly-designed engine, gave the aircraft a higher maximum speed at
altitude than its predecessors (see Figure 13) The scatterplot in Figure 14 shows not
only the increase in maximum Mach at altitude for the MIG-21 FISHBED but also for
the MIG-25 FOXBAT (Figures 13 and 14 on page 37).
The FOXBAT was designed as a single-mission aircraft to counter the proposed
US XB-70 supersonic bomber. That the FOXBAT was built anyway when the B-70
was cancelled is a confirmation of the thesis that a new weapon system than can be
built -v^ill be built (a mechanistic version of the "technological imperative" model).
Gunston says that the FOXBAT's design "owed much to (the) A-5 Vigilante;" that the
aircraft's "high wing and wide boxy fuselage mainly comprising inlet ducts and engines"
was "pioneered by Vigilante."**^ The Foxbat was never designed to engage in air-to-air
combat with other fighters, but rather as a "straight-line" interceptor for high-altitude
applications and fairly long range. When the XB-70 was cancelled, the FOXBAT was
purchased primarily as a long-range, high-speed, high-altitude reconnaissance platform.
The FOXBAT's wing loading is indicative of its mission (see Figure 15, page 38). In
general, low wing loading is desirable for air-to-air combat, while the opposite is
desirable for a straight-line air defense interceptor. Good cruise efficiency requires high
wingloading values.
The MIG-23 FLOGGER was designed in approximately 1963. Its most
immediately recognizable feature is its variable-geometry wing. The variable-geometr>-
wing (VGW), or "swing-wing", was "so similar to the NASA/GD (General Dynamics)
'^^Gunston, Aircraft, p. ISO.
,,Francis J. Hale, Introduction to Aircraft Performance Selection, and Desi(New York: John Wiley c& Sons, 1984), p. 17. -^ '
"^-Gunston Aircraft, n. 190 and Bill Gunston, Modern Air Combat (London:
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Figure 12. Evolution of Aspect Ratio (1945-1965)
36
Source: Janes All the World's Aircraft 1 980- 1 98 1, p. 192.
Figure 13. MIG-21 FISHBED
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Figure 15. Evolution ofWingloading (1945-1965)
aerodynamics of (the) F-Ill it was probably plagiarized."'^^ That may be so, but the
fact remains that the Soviets apparently had their reasons for going with the VGW
design. One, and probably the most likely, is that the designer faces a genuine dilemma
in determining an aircraft's wing sweep—a high sweep with low aspect ratio is necessary
for high speed, while a low sweep with high aspect ratio is required for good low speed
performance. If the conllicting mission requirements of the Khrushchev period could
not be reconciled (or just as likely, anticipated by the OKB) the VC;W seems like an
acceptable solution (see Figure 16, next page). There are other possible explanations,
however, such as the desire to decrease takeoff and landing speeds (by increasing the
lift-drag coedlcient of the wing in the forward-swept position), or to reduce supersonic
drag and delay transonic buflct and instability (with the wing in the fully-swept
position).
The Khrushciiev period saw the "resurrection" of the SUKIIOI OKB and the
acquisition of several SUKIIOI designs. The first of these was the SU-7 FIITFR and




Gunston, Aircraft of the Soviet Union, p. 186.
Leland M. Nicolai, Fundamentals of Aircraft Design, (San Jose: MFTS, 1984),
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Figure 16. MIG-23 FLOGGER
Sukhoi had done at the Tupolev 0KB. The FITTER had a ver>- highly-swept wing
(see Figure 17, next page). The 62-degree wingsweep and the FITTER'S Lyulka AL-7F
turbojet engine, gave it a high penetration speed. In general it can be said that the
SUKHOI 0KB tends to use Lyulka engines, while MIG prefers powerplants made by
the Tumanskiy design bureau. Figure 1 8 (page 40) shows the evolution of maximum
(afterburning) thrust and the generally more powerful L^nalka engines. In 1961
SUKHOI used a Tumanskiy engine for his SU-15 FLAGON, with predictable results
for its relative maximum thrust.
The FITTER had some severe limitations-for example, ver}' small internal fuel
tankage. This led to the requirement for a heavy load of external fuel carriage, which
made impossible any significant weapons load. Thus, the figures commonly cited for
these two characteristics obscure the true capability of the aircraft: the necessity of
choice between fuel and weapons was essentially a choice between an aircraft with
"long legs" but little ordnance, or one with a heavy load of ordnanace that could not
be flown to great depth. Nevertheless, the SU-7 FITTER did have good low-level
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Figure 18. Evolution of Maximum Thrust (lbs) (1945-1965)
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toughness. In addition, it also had a large ordnance-carn'ing capacity, although
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Figure 19. Evolution of Ordnance-Carr\'ing
Capability (lbs) (1945-1965)
The FITTER'S highly-swept wings and its external weapons/fuel load combined
to give it a very high rotation speed and, consequently, a long ground run (almost
7,900 feet). In fact, this was true too for the other SUKHOI designs of the period
(SU-9 FISHPOT B, SU-11 FISHPOT C, and the SU-15 FLAGON A; see Figure 20,
next page). This tended to be true of all PVO air defense interceptors, which could
count on long, high-quality runways. If these same aircraft were called upon to
operate "at the front," they woud have found it nearly impossible to do so from
shorter, often unimproved wartime strips in the forward area. One wonders how the
SU-7 FITTER could have been used at all.
The SU-9 and the SU-11 FISHPOT aircraft were based on the delta wing designs
SUKHOI had worked on but rejected for the FITTER. They shared a number of


























Figure 20. Evolution of Ground Run (ft) (1945-1965)
Unlike the SU-7, however, the FISHPOT aircraft were not easy to fly. Although the
SU-11 had only two AAMs while the SU-9 had been equipped with four, the SU-ll's
missiles had a range approximately three times as great as the SU-9's and its air
intercept (AI) radar was more powerful, with search and track capability about double
that of its predecessor.
The SU-15 FLAGON, a version of which in September 1983 shot down a South
Korean Boeing 747 passenger aircraft, was designed in approximately 1962-63. Its
internal fuel capacity was increased somewhat over earlier designs, perhaps prompted
by the requirement to get to distant intercept points from inland (high-quality) airfields
with long runways. In general, PVO air defense interceptors had greater combat radii
than Air Force (WS) fighters (see Figure 22, next page).
To summarize fighter developments in this period, the MIG OKB continued its
trend toward building faster aircraft, primarily for the air defense mission, but also for
reconnaissance. MIG aircraft were also a part of the VVS inventory, but their design
characteristics did not optimize them for the ground support role. After producing the
MIG-25 FOXBAT to meet a threat which never developed (the XB-70), the MIG OKB
began the FLOGGER series, which included a VGW design in order to accomodate a
variety of requirements which could not otherwise be reconciled and to provide a
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This period also saw the first acquisitions of SUKHOI aircraft. These included
the SU-7 FITTER, with an impressive ordnance-carr\'ing capability and good low-level
performance. This made it the first "dedicated" ground support/attack aircraft for the
VVS in the postwar period. Its development foreshadowed the increasing VVS interest
in ground attack, aircraft which became evident after 1964. The SUKHOI OKB also
produced several air defense interceptors for PVO.
C. 1964-1973, THE RISE OF GROUND ATTACK
When the MIG-21 was originally produced, it was optimized for the short-range
intercept mission. A product of the 1950's, it was quite limited in its avionics,
navigation equipment and cockpit displays. Subsequent development sought to correct
these deficiencies as well as its limited weapons and payload capacity.
The FISHBED J, and its subsequent variants, incorporated the Jay Bird AI
radar, replacing the Spin Scan radar present on earlier models of the aircraft. The Jay
Bird operates at a higher frequency than Spin Scan, employs a different scanning
method, and has slightly better range in both search and track modes. It is part and
parcel of the new weapons fit for the FISHBED in that it provides target illumination
for the semi-active radar-homing version the AA-2 ATOLL AAM.**^
MIG also doubled the number of wing stations to four, improving
simultaneously air combat capability and ground attack potential. The addition of the
pylons tripled the ground attack payload potential, and doubled the number of possible
AAM's. The FISHBED H, the reconnaissance variant, is basically similar to the
FISHBED J but carries an external pod with forward-facing or oblique cameras,
infrared sensors, and electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment.
Other changes made to the FISHBED in this time period were in the area of
propulsion. The progressive improvements to the Tumanskiy R-11 turbojet included
enlarged afterburners and provisions for flap blowing.'^^ The R-13 engine that replaced
the R-11 has an advanced afterburner, a new compressor with greater airflow capacity
"^^This missile was originally an infrared-guided AAM.
Flap blowing helps to increase the coefficient of lift, in turn enabling an aircraft
to take oft and land" at lower speeds {shorter eround run). Flap blowins energizes the
airflow on the wing; it is done bv extracting hr2h pressure air from the last stase of the
engine compressor and pipine it to slots just in front of the wine trailing^edge or
behind the Feadine edge flaps." It reenereizes the boundarv laver (the laver of air next
to the wing's skin), increasine the coeflicTent of lift. See Charles E. Dole', Flight Theory
and Aerodynamics (New Yor& John Wiley & Sons, 19S1), pp. 142-145.
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(these provide for greater thrust), and it is lighter in weight. Finally, the R-25 has an
advanced, high-pressure ratio compressor with a significantly lower . specific fuel
consumption than earlier powerplants.^^
SUKHOI temporarily departed from the long-standing association of his design
bureau with the Lyulka engine when the SU-15 was designed. He chose to use the
Tumanskiy R-11 engine found in the early FISHBED aircraft, and later switched to the
upgraded R-13, just as had the MIG 0KB. In addition to new engines, the FLAGON
E and FLAGON F models have a slightly redesigned wing; they have a larger span and
outer portion of reduced sweep, which creates a "kink" in the wing's leading edge
(Figure 23, next page). This kink is a vortex inducer, performing the same kind of
boundary layer control function provided for in the FISHBED by fiap blowing. The
FLAGON makes use of both devices, suggesting increased attention on the part of
SUKHOI to the limitations imposed by the demands of an aircraft with a rotation
speed of approximately 215 knots and a takeoff ground run of nearly 8,000 feet.
The new FLAGON aircraft also have a new A I radar; the Twin Scan, which
replaces the older Skip Spin. Open source information is hard to find on the Twin
Scan but it is probably more powerful than its predecessor and may have enhanced
ECM/ECCM (electronic counter-countermeasures) features.
In the ground attack arena, MIG determined around 1965 that the original
design for the MIG-23 FLOGGER was not really adequate for the ground attack
mission, and began development of a follow-on making use of the basic air defense
FLOGGER airframe. The FLOGGER D has no AI radar but a broad, fiat,
downsloping nose containing a variety of sensors for the air-to-ground mission. The
aircraft also includes armored side panels, a new six-barrel gun and a new weapons and
avionics fit (see Figure 24, page 47).
The FLOGGER D has a doppler navigation radar and a laser designator in its
nose. There are bomb racks on the fuselage, in addition to five pylons, which may be
plumbed for fuel carriage. The aircraft is capable of carr>'ing twice as much ordnance
as its air-to-air cousin. Commensurate with its ground attack role are fixed air inlets
and engine nozzle. Finally, the FLOGGER has an ECM jammer pod on the wing
leading edge, and a head-up display (HUD).^^
^^Janes All the World's Aircraft, p. 845.
A HUD is a pane of glass, on which is projected such necessarv fiieht data
symbology as speed, heading, altitude, weapon status, etc. The data "is generated
45
Figure 23. SU-15 FLAGON E/F
Another new ground attack aircraft in this time period was SUKHOI's SU-17
FITTER C and FITTER D. These designs attempted to retain what was good in the
original SU-7 FITTER, and improve what was detrimental to performance. To this
end SUKHOI made a variet}' of changes, the first and most obvious being the addition
of VGW. This increased the aircraft's lift coefficient, reducing rotation and approach
speeds by about 40 knots, and decreasing the groundrun by about 5,800 ft. Turn
radius was halved and control forces were reduced significantly. Thus, Gunston says
that the SU-17's
in-flieht agility, ranee and field length have all benefited [also! from the new
Lyulka engine, which thoush more powerful actually bums fuel rather less
rapidly th^n the [earlier] ALwF-1; ana there has been a modest increase in fuel
capacity.
electronically and focused at infinity. This allows the pilot to keep looking outside the
cockpit, which is safer and more effective in combat.
Gunston, Modern Air Combat, p. 160.
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Figure 24. Comparison of MlG-23 (top) and MIG-27 (bottom)
Eight highly-rated pylons give the aircraft a good ordnance capacity; four of the
stations are plumbed for fuel tankage and go a long way toward increasing combat
radius. A wide variety of weapons can be carried by the FITTER; including all kinds
of general purpose bombs, rockets of various sizes, ASMs and, like nearly all other
ground attack aircraft in the VVS, nuclear weapons. Avionics include a navigation
radar, laser designator, HUD, ECM and, as do most Soviet fighters, a radar warning
receiver (RWR).
The final aircraft considered in this section is the SU-24 FENCER, a
totally new design ownmg no direct relationship to am^ existing type from the
same 0KB. Indeed, it owes more to the American F-111 than to anv, other
single type, even to the almost certainly mistaken use of side-bv-side seats.^
'Gunston, Modern Air Combat, p. 162.
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The SU-24 has a tremendous ordnance-carrying capacity; approximately 18,000 lbs. It
also has very "long legs," a multipurpose radar, laser designator, full ECM suite, a
multisensor weapon-delivery system, and a full set of leading- and trailing-edge slats
and flaps for excellent control and stability. If the FENCER is anything like the
European Panavia Tornado-and there is good reason to suspect that at least many of
its components are similar-it can operate over a wide range of flight regimes with
smooth and fatigue-free low-level missions. (See Figure 25, next page).
The evolution of Soviet fighter technology in the 1964-1973 period can best be
characterized by pointing to the growth in recce, ECM, and ordnance-carrying
capacity. In the area of reconnaissance, the.FISHBED H was deployed with a wide
variety of sensors, including a real-time television downlink. This is one of
various technical means designed for speeding-up the processing and transmision






e^information to the interested parties directly from on board the
When the Soviets developed the ability to acquire targets beyond the FEBA and
deep in the enemy's rear area, it became possible for them to consider deeper attacks
than had previously been the case. As will be shown later, this is exactly what they
did, despite the enormous relative cost of transmitting reconnaissance data
electronically via a data link compared to flying a sensor over enemy territory, imaging
targets, and returning to base for processing, analysis and subsequent dissemination.
In the area of ECM, the Soviet aircraft of this period are equipped with
360-degree RWR coverage. These are typically the simplest and least expensive (in
terms of the burden imposed on aircraft performance) of ECM devices. By means of
^^In 1984 Manfred Rotsch (the German head of the Planning Department of
Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB), one of the three participants in the Panavia
Tornado program) was arrested for passing to the Soviets critical information about
the Tornado. The Washington Post has reported that "Rotsch has probably betrayed
the complete plans for the Tornado fighter plane" and that "because of the kind of
information compromised, the Rotsch case surpasses in importance that of Guntcr
Guillaume, a close advisor to then-chancellor Willy Brandt, wnose unmasking as a spy
caused Brandt to resisn in 1974." William Drozdiak, "Soviets Seen Escalatms Drive
for West's Industrial Secrets," The Washington Post, 24 October 1984, p. A26. The US
Department of Defense has also publicly cited this case as particularly serious and adds
that Rotsch had operated as a spy from 1967-1984. See Soviet Acquisition of Military
Significant Western Technology: An Update (Washington, D.C.: Department of
Defense, 1985), p. 20.
^^Marshal of Aviation S. Krasevskiy, "Trends in the Use of Aircraft in a Nuclear
War," Vocnnaya Mysl', March 1967, in Selected Readim^s From 'Military Thought,'
1963-1973 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Omce, 1982), p. 152.
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Phc. 17. lIcTpcCiiTc.Tb-GoMCap.iiipoBuiMK «To?iiajio»
Translation: Tornado fighter-bomber
Source: A. N. Ponamarev, Aviaisiya Nastoyashchego I Budushchego (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1984), p. 80.
CO
Source: Janes All the World's Aircraft, 1985-1986, p. 251.
Figure 25. Comparison ofPanavia TORNADO and SU-24 FENCER
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flashing lights on a cockpit display or an audible tone, the RWR notifies the pilot that
a hostile radar has established a track.^^ The target aircraft can then undertake some
form of countermeasure. This can range from brute force "noise jamming" to very
sophisticated types of deception.
In noise jamming the target aircraft transmits a noise-like signal on the same
frequency band at which the enemy radars were operating. In this case, the noise-like
signal strength would exceed that of the weaker target echo-return, whiting out a
sizable portion of the enemy's radar display. A drawback to noise jamming is that it
dissipates power; for an aircraft it may be difficult to "outshout" a ground-based radar
facility. Noise jamming can be spread across several bandwidths (barrage noise
jamming) or concentrated on one known threat frequency (spot jamming). This is the
far more efficient form of jamming but it requires knowledge of the enemy's radar
frequencies. Furthermore, even when spot jamming can be employed, it is seldom
directional in nature; the energy is radiated in all directions, wasting 99.9 percent.
This has focused attention on "power management," by which ECM resources
should be more integrated, automated, effective and elTicient, by deploying the best
CO
jamming strategy for the particular situation at hand. Power management techniques
are used on the US F-15 and F-IU. The Soviets are well aware of the importance of
these ECM techniques and their countermeasures.^^
One type of deception involves beam-spUtting, which measures the point of the
strongest echo-return corresponding to the center of the radar beam. The deception
jammer (repeater) retransmits the received radar pulse with power inversely
proportional to that with which it was received. This introduces severe azimuth and
^^"Typically an RWR is arranged to warn that a track has been established
whenever a high" PRF (pulse repetition frequency) ... is sustained for a preselected
period." Gunston, Modern Air Combat, p. 52.
^^Gunston, Modern Air Combat, p. 54.
^^"Jammers Add EfTectiveness, Complexity," Aviation Week and Space
Technology. 27 January- 1975, pp. 63-77.
"One measure of Soviet understanding of the importance and principles of
electronic warfare is to be found in the contents of a 444-baee textbook pubhshed in
the USSR in 196S. entitled 'Principles of Jamming and Electronic Reconnaissance,'
authored by S. A. Vakin and L. N. Shustov. One long-time U.S. airborne
countermeas'ures designer describes the book's contents as 'ver\' impressive' .... The
Soviet textbook on electronic warfare (whch was translated by the USAF's Foreisn
Technoloev Division in 1969), reveals that Russian specialists' are well aware of the
vulnerabifity of conical-scan tvpe radar to (this kind oQ deception." "Jammers add
Eflectiveness, Complexity," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 11 Januar>' 1975, pp.
63-77.
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elevation target position errors. Another type of deception is range gate stealing, in
which the repeater retransmits the skin echo at high power and then progressively
introduces time delays, stealing away the "range gates" and causing the threat emitter
to track the stronger false target. These techniques and others must be assumed to be
capabilities of Soviet fighters, particularly in those cases where ECM pods are carried.
Both the MIG and SUKHOI OKB's made improvements to existing designs and
created new ones in this time period. New avionics systems, better powerplants,
increased attention to ECM and greater ordnance-carr>-ing capacity characterize the
aircraft designed from 1964-1973.
D. 1973-1985, THE RISE OF AIR COMBAT
The MIG and SUKHOI OKB's developed and sent to production facilities many
new figher designs in this most recent time period. Several improved upon old designs,
in some cases with marginal upgrades; others contained such great improvements that
new designators were assigned. Among the former, MIG created the FLOGGER G in
about 1975, incorporating a better AI radar than that on the FLOGGER B. The
FLOGGER G also was given a new powerplant, the Tumanskiy R-29 replacing the
R-27. The change boosted the FLOGGER G's rhilitar>' power and maximum
(afterburning) thrust, increasing both sea level Mach performance (Mach at altitude
was not affected) and thrust-to-weight ratio. The Soviets have been continually
searching for better propulsion systems for their fighters. That they are keenly
interested in Western developments is undeniable (see Figure 26, next page).
MIG also brought out a new version of the FLOGGER ground attack variant,
the FLOGGER J. Open sources indicate only that the FLOGGER J includes new
nose sensors to improve ground attack performance. SUKHOI also improved its
ground attack offerings with the FITTER H and FITTER K. Among the
improvements in these aircraft is the modification of the dorsal spine, possibly
permitting increased internal fuel tankage or additional avionics and ECM. A large
number of these aircraft are used in the tactical reconnaissance role.
The basic FOXBAT airframe was retrofitted with a new A I radar, giving the
newly-created FOXBAT E a limited lookdown/shootdown capability similar to that
found on the FLOGGER air-to-air fighters. The FOXBAT E also now carries new
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Y axis: Engine thrust-to-weight ratio
X axis: Year of first flisht
Source: Ponamarev, Aviarsiya, p. 188.
The Tumanski}' R-29 "is simpler than the corresponding American F-lOO
(upper right oFabove graph), with fewer compressor stages and a much lower
pressure ratio: but it is more powerful." Janes All me World's Aircraft,
1984-1985, p. §45.
Figure 26. Soviet Interest in Western Propulsion Systems
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The FOXHOUND, designed about 1974, uses the basic FOXBAT airframe, but
has a longer fuselage and extended empennage. Air inlets are also slightly changed.
FOXHOUND also has a two-seat cockpit, a new pulse-Doppler AI radar and eight
new AAM's, including the long-range, radar-guided AA-Q.^*^ The Department of
Defense has stated that
the documentation on the F-18 fire control radar served as the technical basis for
new lookdown/shootdown engagement radars for the latest generation of Soviet
fighters."^
Until ver>' recently, Soviet fighters have not had the ability to engage targets
flying near the ground, because their AI radars have "lost" the relatively weak target
radar echo in the "clutter" caused by the ground or sea (which refiects radar energy).
The development of computers and software to distinguish the target from the ground
clutter meant that the Soviets were no longer limited to "blue-sky shots."
Other important features on the new generation of AI radars also add to combat
capability. In the past, different parts of the target aircraft being illuminated presented
echo returns of various strength, which caused the tracking radar to shift its aim point
around the target, "introducing spurious angular rate data into the lead angle
computation."^^ New techniques eliniinate this "glint" problem.
Another valuable feature is "raid assessment," which allows pilots to determine
the size of incoming raids beyond visual range (BVR). Track-while-scan is a feature
that allows a pilot to look for and engage multiple targets simultaneously. Previously,
AI radars had two modes: search and track. One could not be in operation while the
other was engaged. Track-while-scan (TWS) allows the pilot to track one or more
targets while continuing to search for more enemy aircraft.
"The extended range and track-while-scan radar capabiUtv for the aircraft was
developed and tested extensively in the MIG-31 [FOXHOUNDT against a variety of
targets including drones simulating cruise missiles at VladimirovKa, a test site on" the
Caspian Sea .... The FOXHOUND is designed to cruise at hish altitudes and ensase
fighter targets in the look-down; shoot-down""mode with radar-euided missiles. In tesls
with the FOXHOUND'S weapon system, Soviet pilots successTuUv intercepted targets
with a radar signature under 1 square meter at altitudes below 200 feet w"hile
(themselves) fiyin^ at an altitude above 20.000 ft." Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.. "Soviets
Deploying New Fighters," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 28 November 1983,
pp. 18-20.
Military Significant Western Technology, p. 8.
Phillip J. Klass, "New Radar Developed for F-18," Aviation Week and Space
Technology, t6 Januar>' 1978, p. 55.
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TWS is a feature designed to work with active radar-guided missiles, which can
be launched in a "fire and forget" mode.^-' The FOXHOUND'S AI radar has been
reported to be "able to handle 20 targets, tracking four and identifying the rest even in
ground clutter."^"^ This would give it a capability remarkably similar to the US F-14
TOMCAT, whose AWG-9 AI radar can "(detect and track) more than 20 targets while
launching and guiding six different targets."^^ And in fact, "some intelligence officials
believe that technology has been obtained by the Soviets from F-14's in Iran."^^ The
US Department of Defense has publicly confirmed that F-14 fire-control radar
documentation has been compromised.^^
In this time period the SUKHOI 0KB- designed the SU-25 FROGFOOT for
close-air support of ground forces. Its mission makes the FROGFOOT the Soviet
counterpart to the USAF A- 10, although in planform it resembles the Northrop A-9,
which lost the USAF competition to Fairchild's A- 10 design. The SU-25 has very high
aspect-ratio wings (6.42), non-afterburning engines, and ten weapons pylons-it is
clearly designed for the close air support role. The FROGFOOT has been in service in
Afghanistan since 19S1, where it has been engaged primarily in coordinated low level
close air support operations with MI-24 helicopter gunships.
The MIG-29 FULCRUM is comparable in size to the USAF F-16 FALCON but
has an advanced AI radar, new AAM's, new engines, greater combat radius, and better
turning performance than its predecessors. It includes the "state-of-the-art avionics
evolving from systems designed originally for the FOXHOUND. "^^ Unlike the
FOXHOUND, however, the FULCRUM has a thrust-to-weight ratio greater than
unity, lower wingloading, and can attain Mach 1.2 at sea level. The SU-27 FLANKER
has slightly better capabilities.
Previously, "radar-guided" AAM's actually were "semiactive radar-guided"
because thev required the platform aircraft to "paint the taraet 'til the missile
splashed"—the weapon simply received refiected radar energy. The disadvantage of
such a svstem is that it requires the launch aircraft to rematn pointed at its target, a
vulnerability in air-to-air combat.
^"^David M. North, "Soviets Test Two-Seat MIG-25 Version," Aviation Week and
Space Technology, 28 March 1977, p. 18.
^"Clarence A. Robinson. Jr.. "US Reexamines Fighter Needs," Aviation Week and
Space Technology, 23 April 1979, p. 19.
"Soviets Press Production, New Fighter Development," Aviation Week and
Space Technology, 16 March 1981, p. 56.
Militarily Significant Western Technology, p. 8.
Robinson, "US Reexamines Fighter Needs," p. 19.
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Two trends are discernible in this period. One is the progressively improved
ability to detect and engage BVR targets. The second is the increased maneuverability
of Soviet fighters. The ability to detect targets at a distance is a function of the AI
radar's search capability. The greater the radar's power, the earlier the detection. If a
target can be acquired without giving away one's presence, then the attacker has the
advantage in the form of surprise.^ The importance of surprise cannot be overstated
because 'Tour out of every five aircraft shot down by fighters never saw their
assailant. "^^ The second trend, greater maneuverability, is also important because, if
surprise is the most important attribute of successful air combat, the ability to
outmaneuver the adversary' comes in second; it confers the ability to stay out of the
enemy's weapons lauch envelope and to continually threaten him.
The evolution of AI radar search and track capability is shown in Figures 27 and
28 (next page). Also important to the development of a first-look, first-shot capability
are long-range missiles. Figure 29 (page 57) shows the evolution of maximum AAVI
ranges. This increasing capability is reflected in the frequent Soviet assertion that
historically, 70 percent of all air-to-air kills were made on the first pass.^^ As designers
have .over the years created more maneuverable fighters with greater combat
persistence, the Soviets have increasingly noted that the first pass probability is not
always 100% and have apparently experimented on a limited basis to develop tactics
that reposition the fighter for another shot opportunity. This interest in maneuvering
air combat increases when the Soviets have received fighters capable of maneuvering
(i.e., with relatively high thrust-to-weight ratios and reduced wingloadings; see Figures
30 and 31, pages 57 and 58).
These two trends now exist simultaneously. On the one hand, technology has
again made it possible to engage in certain types of close-in, hard-turning air combat,
while at the same time, new weapons and electronics have given fighter aircraft
long-range, off-boresight kill capabilities that relax the past requirement for stern
conversion. Figure 32 (page 59) captures the unambiguous trend in first-look,
first-shot capability. Figure 33 (page 60) shows the evolution of "maneuverability;"
Gunston, Modern Air Combat, p. 187.
^^"Since the first pass would be made under GCI control, and the attack would
be at verv high airspeeds and at relativelv Ions ranees with radar missiles, a second
pass at the tareet did not seem likelv. There would-be no need for close combat to
occur." Rana Pennington, "Pilot Initiative in the Soviet Air Force," in Murphy, Soviet
Air Forces, "pp. \A9-\Sb.
m
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greatest ability to maneuver is in the far comer (upper left rear). If we use SEARCH
to stand for long-range kill capability (it is correlated to TRACK at higher than .99
and MSLRANGE at higher than .95), we can combine these two trends. Maximum
maneuverability amd maximum kill-range are shown in Figure 34 (page 60) in the far
comer.
Since 1973, then, the Soviets have developed a new aircraft especially for the
close air support (CAS) role, new aircraft approaching a first-look, first-shot capability,
and increasingly maneuverable fighters with advanced avionics and weapons. Before
looking at the interaction between these technological developments and Soviet tactical
air employment doctrine, it is necessar>' to tum to the evoluion of Soviet military
doctrine since World War II. This topic is covered in the next section.
/^SEARCH, TR.ACK and MSLRANGE are the names of three variables in this
thesis' data base. For a more complete description of the data base, includinc the











Figure 32. Evolution ofLong-Rangc Kill Capability
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF AIR EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
A. 1945-1953, THE STAGNATION OF MILITARY DOCTRINE
The immediate postwar period (1945-1953) was one of little doctrinal innovation
and characterized by strict adherence to Stalin's 'Tive permanent operating principles."
These five principles (the stabihty of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and
quality of the divisions, armament, and the organizing ability of the commanders) were
formulated in 1941 as the basis for Soviet military thinking. They are some of the
most important principles for the conduct of conventional warfare and the
conventional war concept dominated Soviet military thinking until long after Stalin's
death in 1953. As a result, Soviet military thinking in the early- to mid-fifties was little
different than Soviet military thinking had been in the Second World War. The
Stalinist legacy was a straitjacket on the development of doctrine and inhibited the
exploration of ideas regarding nuclear weapons and intercontinental war. Despite the
fact that nuclear weapons were under development in the Soviet Union at this time, no
doctrinal discussion was allowed during Stalin's lifetime. ^^
This same point is made in a number of studies of Soviet doctrine of the period.
H.S. Dinerstein explains that Stalin's formulation of the five permanently operating
principles "became the last and only word on the subject for more than ten years. "^^
Dr. Jonathan R. Adelman also criticizes Stalin's omissions in formulating Soviet
military doctrine. He refers to the importance of surprise, nuclear weapons, and the
impact of foreign military doctrine. Like Dinerstein, Adelman points out that "Stalinist
'^Harriet Fast and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder:





Dmerstein goes on to criticize the concept, saving: "... This formulation is so
truistic as to be almost devoid of meaning. Obviously the countrv with the stronger
econorny, the better morale, superior equipment, larger forces, and abler commanders
will win the war. The only realy substantive point in Stalin's formula was his
conclusion from the above premises: that transitorv factors such as surprise could not
determine the outcome of the war. He argued that' the Germans, who had alreadv lost
the advantages derived from surprise, would lose the war because thev were inferior in
the permanently operating factors." H. S. Dinerstein, IVar ami the Soviet Union:
rsucCear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking (New





military doctrine generally emphasized conventional land war over possible nuclear air
war.""^"^
Soviet analysts in the post-Stalin period shared this view. Writing in the Soviet
General StatT journal, Voennaya Mysl' (Militar>^ Thought), in 1964, General Major S.
Kozlov said:
In the first postwar period (1946-1953) the development of Soviet militarv theory
predominantly proceeded alone the traditional path of generalization and'analysis
of the experience of the past war, of working out on this basis conciusioni^nd
recommendations for the conduct of armed conflicts by conventional means.
This analysis meant that the Soviets saw victory in a future war as resulting
from the accumulation of successful battles foueht along continuous and slowlv
changing fronts. Frontal breakthroughs would" be achieved by the deUberate
massmg of soldiers and equipment on the main axis of attack, with a high densitv
of menT tanks, artiller\', and planes in the strike sectors, followed by envelopment
and thrusts to the rear-. Ground forces would be predoniinant in'the European
theater of a future war.
Still other observers of Soviet military doctrine repeat this refrain. Raymond
Garthoff blames "the legacy of Stalinist stagnation" on the "virtual canonization" of
Stalinist military doctrine as it existed in 1945.^^ Stephen M. Meyer characterized the
planning constraints placed on the General Staff in the postwar period as arbitrarv'.
In this regard, Soviet failure to discuss the importance of nuclear weapons and their
impact on modern warfare did not, however, prevent them from developing their own
nuclear weapons. Dinerstein points out that the decision to develop the new
technology only means that the Soviets, while seeing them as important, did not
Clearly. Soviet writers were sisnificantlv influenced bv World War II; "... a
future major war was seen as cast in- the mold of World War Il—that is. as a protracted
land war m which ground troops, supported by tanks, artillen,', and planes, would plav
the decisive role." Dr. Jonathan K. Adelman, "The Evolution of Soviet Militar\'




"^^General Vlajor S. Kozlov "The Development of Soviet Military S(
d War II," Voennaya Mysl , Februar>' 1964, p. 29.
^^Adelman, "Evolution," p. 28.
Ravmond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger,
1958), pp. 51-63.
Stephen M. Mever, Soviet Theater Forces: Development of Doctrine and
Objectives (Lelchworth: Garden City Press, 1983), p. 12.
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consider them decisive.
Stagnant doctrinal development did not mean stagnant weapons development. It
meant, rather, an absence of criteria for making thCgbest decision as to the
allocation of resources among various weapon systems.
Thomas W. Wolfe argues that both Western and Soviet writers have judged
Stalin too harshly. Although it is clear that most, if not all, hold Stalin responsible for
the delay in Soviet doctrinal accommodation to the nuclear age, Wolfe explains that
Stalin's orientation was "partly the product of necessity" and partly the result of his
preoccupation with Europe. Because Stalin felt that the principal opponent in the
postwar period would be the United States, which first had a monopoly on nuclear
weapons and later an advantage in strategic nuclear delivery* vehicles, the kind of
conventional militar>' power the Soviet Union could bring to a conflict would not be
or*
very effectively brought to bear directly against the United States.
Even though the actual numbers of the Group of Soviet forces in Germany
(GSFG) remained at a fairly constant 400.000 troops in the early 1950's, the Soviets
upgraded and improved both the field armies and their supporting tactical air assets.
The development of Soviet tactical air assets was a consequence of Soviet experience in
World War II. In that war, "the great majority of all Soviet Air Force activity . . . was
directed towards the support of the ground forces." Marshal Sokolovskiy has said
that 76% of all Soviet Air Force (SAF) sorties flown in WW II were carried out by
tactical air assets in support of the ground forces and that in the future, "the Air Force
was destined primarily to support the ground forces in actions taking place directly
Dinerstein, War, p. 9.
"If the United States was to be deterred from pressing its nuclear advantage,
the Soviet forces at hand would have to do the job, and the place where thev could
best be brought to bear was obviouslv Europe . . . the Soviet Union could ih efTect
hope to make Western Europe a hosta'se for American good behavior .... Lacking as
vet the means to adopt a strategv of nuclear deterrence . . . Stalin had no choice T . .
but to rely on Russia s traditional threater forces as the primarv instrurnent of Soviet
militan.^ policv." Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe,' 1945-19/0 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 33-37.
Q 1
Within the Ground Forces, the Soviets increased battlefield mobilitv and
firepower with new tanks (T-54) and artillerv. as well as mechanizing the losistics train.
The 24th Air Army in East Germanv included some 500 MIG-15 FAGOT" fishters by
1952 and besan to receive the MIG-H FRESCO fighters in 1953. Wolfe, Soviet
Power, pp. 39'-40. Also, Robert A. Kilmarx, A History of Soviet Air Power (New York:
Praeger, 1962), p. 229.
M. J. Armitaee and R. A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 19S3), p. 141.
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over the battlefield."^'^ Another observer of Soviet air activity in WW II says that the
SAF was
thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the offensive throughout the depth of the
whole ofle'nsive zone, concentrating on the lines of the mam land force thrusts.
Thus, the legacy ofWW II to the SAF and its employment concepts was one which
ostensibly concentrated the main strength of the SAF on the battlefields and close
enemv rear areas.
As was pointed out earlier, however, ground attack was not the orientation of
Soviet fighter design at this time. The immediate postwar years were a time of
significant changes to the v^ing, designed to make the aircraft fiy higher and faster in
the air defense role. The impetus for air defense designs came from outside the Soviet
Union; German aircraft, prototypes, test data, factories, designers, engineers, and
production personnel were all captured by the Soviets at the end of the war. This was
truly acquisition of foreign technology on a massive scale. However, it was technology
oriented towards Germany's defense problems, not the USSR's. Thus, although
Germany was designing air defense aircraft to cope with US and British strategic
bombing, and even though the Soviets' avowed air employment concept was of the
ground attack variety, the USSR nevertheless incorporated German technology into its
new aircraft designs.
This had important consequences for the way fighters were used in the Korean
War. One would have expected, looking at their doctrine, that Soviet-trained
Communist forces would fiy groimd attack missions in the Korean War. In fact,
however, Chinese air employment concepts suggest a predilection for the air defense
mission. The Soviet-supplied, Soviet-trained, and in some cases Soviet-fiown, Chinese
Air Force MIG-15 and MIG-17 fighters were not fiown in support of ground force
actions, even in the north. They were used for air defense against UN bombers
_
involved in interdiction missions over northwest Korea.
^^Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy, Soviet
Doctrine and Concepts (London: Pall Mall, 1963), pp. 130, 158.
^"^Armitage and Mason. Air Power, p. 141, citing I. V. Timokhovich.. The
Operational Art of the Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War (Moscow: Voenizdat,
1976), p. 9.
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This, of course, is how the Soviets trained them to fly their fighter aircraft. The
Soviets in turn employed their tactical fighter assets in the manner they did, not
because their military doctrine so directed them {it directed that ground attack missions
should be flown), but rather, because the available technology drove them to pursue air
defense-type missions. At the same time, the recently-acquired German air defense
technology constrained them from executing the types of ground attack missions one
would have expected by looking at their militar>' doctrine.
B. 1954-1964, A PERIOD OF TRANSITION
When Stalin died in 1953, an era of Soviet militar>' doctrine is widely held to have
come to an end. However, the near unanimity that attends characterizations of the
1945-1953 period disappears in descriptions of the post-Stalin era. For example, the
Scotts claim the impact of Stalin's death was immediate. ^^ Like the Scotts, Dr.
Adelman also claims that, "freed from the straitjacket of postwar Stalinism," the Soviet
military went through "rapid and radical changes" in doctrine, and that the
dominant motif of the period (1954-1964) was a recognition of the revolution in
militarv aflairs wrouglit bv the advent of nuclear weapons and missile
technology.
Thomas Wolfe, however, claims that the Stalinist tradition persisted after his passing.^'''
Stephen Meyer also argues that the Soviet military- leadership maintained some
important ideas left over from the StaUnist period.^^
It is clear that there is Uttle agreement on the nature of the doctrinal changes in
the years after Stalin's death. Although all the authors identify the period as one in
which the Stalinist hold on military' thinking is relaxed, there is no such agreement as
^^Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 39.
^^Adelman, "Evolution," p. 29.
"Stalin's persistent endeavor to improve Soviet capabihties for theater warfare
in Europe was to help prolong the dominance of a continental militar>' tradition in the
Soviet strategic outlook." Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 35.
QQ
'The first was that strategic bombing of an enemy's population centers and
economic-industrial facilities was likelv to be ineffective in forcing capitulation ....
The second impression was that, while nuclear weapons did represent an enormous
increase m deliverable firepower, thev were not decisive (or absolute) weapons ....
Nuclear weapons were not the principal means of militarv combat, but would continue
to play a supportive role in militarv operations .... The balanced development of all
combat arms was necessar>-, with the Ground Forces as the main arm." Mever,
Theater Forces, pp. 12-13.
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to how quickly the Soviets adapted their ideas to new technology and other military
doctrines, notably that of the United States. In fact, the period should be considered
transitional; it was characterized by a number of extensive doctrinal debates within the
professional Soviet militarv' jounals and newspapers, and there were many cases of
public reversals of opinion and even public reprimands. All of these suggest that a
great deal of uncertainty surrounded the development of new weapons and the
consideration of new doctrines and employment concepts. The decade from 1954-1964
emerges as one of doctrinal uncertainty, confusion, and ambivalence.
In July 1953, five months after Stalin's death. Admiral of the Fleet N.
Kuznetsov was quoted by Pravda as saying, "The experience of the Great Fatherland
War alone is no longer sufficient. "^^ Raymond Garthoff says that this offhand
comment in fact betrays the inadequate theoretical foundation of military' doctrine.^^
In September, Voennaya Mysl carried an article by General Major N. A. Talenskiy
that appeared to criticize the long-standing Soviet reliance on Stalin's five permanent
operating principles.^^ The Scott's say that Talenskiy did not actually challenge Stalin's
formulation, but did imply that the five permanent operating principles were not
basic.^^ Dinerstein, on the other hand, says that "Talenskiy rejected Stalin's formula"
and that "for the first time since 1945 a Soviet publication had envisaged a possible war
of the future essentially different from World Wars I and 11."^"^
Talenskiy's article opened the floodgates of discussion as nearly a dozen articles
and letters on theoretical issues were published in the following year. Garthoff argues
persuasively that "no oflicial line on the subject existed" and that "this was a real, and
not a staged, discussion."^'* As well, it seems fairly safe to suggest that Talenskiy's
ideas were responsible ones, as he had for several years been the editor of the military
newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), and at the time of his article in Voennaya
Mysl (September 1953) he was chief editor of that professional journal. Nevertheless,
^^Admiral of the Fleet N. Kuznetsov, Pravda, 26 July 1953. Quoted in Garthoff,
Soviet Strategy, p. 63.
^"^GarthofT, Soviet Strategy, p. 63.
^^General Major N. Talenskiv, "On the Question of the Character of the Laws of
Military' Science," Voennaya A/v5/', "November 1953, p. 30.
Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 40.
^^Dinerstein, War, p. 9.





despite the absence of an "ofTicial" line in 1953, the Scotts claim Talenskiy had clearly
committed an indiscretion, as he was removed from his position as editor of the journal
in June 1954 and "banished" to the Institute of Histor>' in the Soviet Academy of
Sciences.^^ Furthermore, the issues he had raised in his article were dealt with in
summary fashion by Defense Minister A. M. Vasilevskiy in a February 1954 article he
wrote for the Soviet militar\' newspaper, in which he reiterated the Stalinist position.^^
Later that same year the Minister of Defense repeated his position that "the outcome
of a war is determined ... by permanently operating factors.
"^"^
The following year Marshal Zhukov became the new Minister of Defense. The
Scotts state that when Zhukov assumed his new command, he criticized Stalin's
permanent operating principles in a secret speech to his top officers.^^ In February'
1955 Tank Marshal P. Rotmistrov published an article in Voennaya Mysi' which
publicly, sharply, and permanently broke with the Stalinist legacy.^^ Rotmistrov argued
that surprise (characterized by Stalin as a transitory factor) had throughout histor\'
been of great significance in combat. Now, in an age of nuclear weapons, surprise
could determine the outcome of the entire war. Thus, Mark Miller says that "taken
together, the Rotmistrov and Talenskiy articles, in effect, repudiated the permanently
operating factors as the basic law of war."^°^ By the end of 1955, Stalin's hold on
Soviet military thought seems to have been loosened considerably-within "the year,
Stalin's military views appear to have been rejected by the majority of Soviet military
theoreticians. "^^^
Nevertheless, although the five permanent operating principles were no longer
considered sufficient as basic laws of war, they did continue to exercise their influence
in that (being truisms, as Dinerstein pointed out) they were reflected in "two threads of
^^Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 40.
/"^Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevskiv, "On Guard Over the Security of
Our Soviet Motherland," Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 Februar>' 1954. Scott and Scott, Armed
Forces, p. 40.
^"^Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevskiv, "The Great Lesson of Historv,"
Krasnaya Zvezda, 1 May 1954. Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 40.
^^Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 40.
^^Marshal of Tank Forces P. Rotmistrov "On the Role of Surprise in
Contemporary War," Voennaya Mysl , February' 1955, pp. 18-19.
^^^Mark E. Miller. Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for
Superiority (Coral Gables: Current Ailairs Tress, 1982), p. 34.
^^^ Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 70.
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continuity" running through Soviet military doctrine into the late 1950's. Stephen
Meyer identifies these as being that "war could only be won by destroying the enemy's
military forces; and nuclear weapons were not the decisive means of warfare. "^^"^
General Major G. I. Pokrovskiy makes a similar point in his book:
But strategic weapons, by their ver>' nature, cannot be considered as independent
and self- sufficient. The onlv correct view regarding the use of various weapons in
warfare is the view of Soviet militarv science: to wit, that all forms of armaments
and technology must be employed in warfare in as close and well-organized
combined operation. Under such conditions, strateeic weapons must be regarded
as a part of the armament of the armed forces, entering into the general system
as an important and irreplaceable link, but not replacmg and supplanting any
other means of combat. Soviet military science teaches that, without
well-organized combined operations of all arms and services (land armies, ^air
forces, and naval fleets), one cannot successfully wage contemporar>' warfare.
General of the Army K. Moskalenko makes a similar argument in an article he wrote
for Krasnaya Zvezda, as does Marshal Rotmistrov.^^'^ Garthoff noted this in his survey
of doctrinal writings. ^'^^ He further argues that even the organizational structure of the
Soviet Ministry of Defense reflected the Soviet commitment to a combined arms
doctrine of warfare, with emphasis on the importance of the Army.^^^
In August 1957 the Soviets successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) and in October of that year the world's first artificial satellite. Sputnik
I. The impact of missile technology on Soviet militar}' doctrine was significant, if not
^"^^Meyer, Theater Forces, p. 13.
General Major G. I. Pokrovskiy, The Role of Science and Technology in
Modern War (Moscow: Voenizdat, 19561. Translated oy Raymond Garthofl' (New
York: Praeger, 195S), p. 70.
^^"^"Soviet miUtary science decisively rejects [that one can] achieve strategic
victorv by means . . . ofone or another new weapon .... no such weapons . . . possess
. . . all-powerful qualitites. Historical experience teaches that with the appearance of
new technoloev, new more powerful and more destructive weapons, the significance of
men on the battlefield not only does not decrease, but increases all the more." General
of the Army K. Moskalenko, Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 September 1954. Also, "It is
entirely clear that atomic and hydrogen weapons alone, without the decisive operations
of the ground forces with their contemporarv material cannot decide the outcome of
the war." Rotmistrov, "Role of Surprise," p. 25.
GartholFs survey of "all available Soviet militarv periodical and other
publications reveals at least eighty specific reaffirmations of the rejection of reliance on
one-weapon strategies in the period 1953 through 1957, and none diverging from it."
Garthoff, Soviet Strategy, p. 76.
106"jj^g Army is predominantly represented (the senior dozen militar>' cheifs all
are Army, including the head of the combined Air Defense Forces, with the NavT and
Air Force chiefs currently ranking about thirteenth and fourteenth in standing)', and
the General Stafi^ of the Armed Forces is the former Army General Stall upgraded."
Garthoff, Soviet Strategy, p. 82.
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immediate. The Soviets saw in the ICBM an opportunity to break the US advantage
in strategic nuclear deliver}' vehicles, which in the late 1950's were the bombers of
Strategic Air Command.^^ GarthofT claims that this view was disseminated in part for
propaganda purposes and that, in fact, the true evaluation by the Soviet military' of the
bomber threat was less extreme.^^^ In addition, Stephen Meyer says that
The pairing of powerful thermonuclear warheads with lone-range missiles (i.e.,
IRBm and ICBM) was an obvious combination. By 19^58 some prominent
Soviet militarv' leaders besarVqto point to the nuclear rocket weapon as the
decisive weapo'n of the timers.
And indeed they were, as Dinerstein makes clear in quoting General Major Talenskiy's
March 1958 characterization of the intercontinental ballistic missile as a "decisive
weapon."^ ^^ This period saw what the Scott's say are "radical changes in all aspects of
warfare," following the introduction of the nuclear weapon and the missile.^ ^^
Just prior to these developments in missile technology, the XXth Party Congress
was held in 1956, at which Khrushchev denounced Stalin and called for a
reexamination of military matters. In response to Khrushchev's proposal the Soviet
General Staff began a series of seminars and discussions, in which all high-ranking
officers participated. The result of these discussions was the determination that future
1 r^n
.
-^^ Marshal Vershinin was quoted in a Pravda article in September 1957 as
saying. "Now the expectation that America's remoteness will spare her militarv blows
m the. event of a new war is no loneer tenable .... ereat distances will no longer plav
a decisive role. What was once "inaccessible has "now become within easv reach.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles can deliver the most terrible weapon, the Kvdrogen
bomb, instantly to the remotest regions on any continent on earth .... missiles now
call into question the expediency"' of further developing bomber aircraft, since the
former are more reliable and dependable." Marshal ol Aviation K. A. Vershinin. "On
the Bellicose Statements ot American. British and West German Generals, Answers oi^
the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces of the USSR, Marshal of Aviation K. A.
Vershinin, to Questions by the Pravda Correspondent," Pravda, 8 September 1957.
^^^Garthoff, Soviet Strategy, p. 223.
^^^Meyer, Theater Forces, p. 14.
,
.^^^"General Major Talenskiv said in so many words that intercontinental ballistic
missiles, were decisive weapons. By this time there could be no doubt that Talenskiv
spoke -for others beside himself . . . 'the Soviet monopoly possession of the decisive
weapon of our time .... the Soviet Union employs the ma'jor advantages it has sained
from possession of the decisive modern weapon.'" Garthofl, Soviet Strate^', p. 227n.
Ill Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 41.
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Soviet niilitar>' doctrine should be based on the availability of nuclear weapons and
missiles.^ ^^
Penkovskiy tells us that at the time, the proceedings and conclusions of the
seminars were state secrets, but were gathered together in a "Special Collection of
Articles," and published for the benefit of educating the Soviet officer corps.
Penkovskiy's notes on the "Special Collection" were intended to provide the West with
a clear picture of the new military doctrine under development in the Soviet Union.
Among the features of this new military doctrine, according to Penkovskiy, were that:
a future war would begin with a sudden nuclear strike, and; the war would be very
short.l^^
In accordance with these changes in Soviet military doctrine. First Secretary
Nikita S. Khrushchev played a large role in the creation in May 1960 of the Strategic
Rocket Forces as a separate service of the Soviet armed forces. The Strategic Rocket
Forces (SRF) represented the elite of the Soviet military. The Scotts observe that the
SRF have, since their creation, always been considered the premier service and that the
SRF commander has always taken precedence over the commanders of the other four
services (Ground Forces, Air Force, National Air Defense, and Nav^-).^^"^ Khrushchev,
in addition to presiding over these organizational changes in the Soviet militar>', also
provided an outline of the new doctrine in his speech to the Supreme Soviet in January
1960. The speech assured the listeners that the USSR had large stockpiles of nuclear
weapons and that
the Air Force and Navy have lost their former importance. These arms are being
replaced and not reduced. Military' aircraft is alrnost entirelv being replaced by
rockets. We have now drasticallv 'reduced, and will reduce further, still, or even
I, the production of bombers and other obsolete aircraft.discontinue,
Khrushchev went on to say that
'^^Olea Penkovskiv, The Penkovskiy Papers (New York: Doubleday, 1965),
translated by Peter Deriabin, p. 24S.
^^
'Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers, p. 250.
^^'^Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 137.
^^^Nikita S. Khrushchev, speech to Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet on 14
January 1960, On Peaceful Coexistence (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1961), pp. 148-163.
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a countrv's defensive capacity is not determined by the number of men under
arms . . .' [but rather] depends in decisive measure on the firepower that countrv
commands.
As a consequence, Khrushchev defended manpower cuts in the armed forces from their
1955 level of 5.76 million down to 3.26 million in 1958. He also proposed to further
cut manpower by over a million men.^^^ This was a sharp break with the earlier view-
that nuclear weapons were not decisive and that "balanced development of all combat
arms was necessary-," with the Army remaining the dominant service.^ ^^
This revision of militar>' doctrine elevated the new nuclear missile weapons to a
privileged place in the Soviet defense schema. Navies, air forces, and ground forces all
came to be seen as less important, if not already obsolete. Combined arms doctrine-in
which all the services contributed to military operations by pursuing a single, integrated
combat plan for the fulfillment of strategic objectives within the theater-no longer
appears to have held sway. The dominant militar>' assumption was that military' goals
could now be accomplished independently and exclusively by nuclear missiles.
Soviet military* planners in this time frame were faced with having to trv' and find
a niche for the air forces within the rather restrictive confines of this new militarv'
doctrine. Two elements combined to generate in the Khrushchev period a continued
emphasis on air defense. First, with theoretical writings of the period increasingly
emphasizing the importance of strategic nuclear weapons and the "threat" posed by the
bombers of Strategic Air Command, it was to be expected that Soviet air employment
concepts would gravitate toward the air defense mission. Second, technological
advances had wrought havoc with Soviet military- theor>', rendering seemingly irrelevant
the hard-won experience of World War II, including the importance of battlefield
ground attack missions.^ ^^ However, the Soviets' failure to fly ground attack missions
in Korea, despite their declared intention to use aircraft in the future the way they had
in World War II, can best be explained by pointing to the nature of fighter design in
^^^Khrushchev, Coexistence, pp. 148-163.
^^^Khrushchev, Coexistence, pp. 148-163.
Meyer, Theater Forces, p. 13.
y^Primarily as a result of Khrushchev's reforms, the Soviet militar\- was
wrenched out of its accustomed wavs ol thinking and forced to reorganize "in line with
the technological facts of life, as he [Khrushchev] saw them." Wolfe. Soviet Power, p.
136. This meant shifting from an almost exclusive preoccupation with continental land
warfare to a new concern for the difficulties imposed by strategic nuclear warfare.
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the immediate postwar years; they had moved toward a capability of higher and faster
flight with their newest fighters, making nearly impossible any serious contibution to
ground support.
Beyond that, despite the fact that air defense had "always been the weakest part
of Soviet air power ... by 1955 the Soviet Air Force had all the major elements of a
first-class strategic air defense organization. "^^^ As a result of these improvements,
PVO Strany (National Air Defense) was made a separate independent service in 1955,
which forced the Soviet Ground Forces to relinquish control over regional defense
matters. This broke a forty-year tradition in which
all Soviet armed forces within a region were subordinate to the Army
Commander. Now [1959] the PVO has its own independent headquarters,
sometimes within the Army region, sometimes side by side with the Army
orsanization.
In addition, PVO appears to have had priority over the Air Force in selecting new
pilots from flight school.^^^
The growing importance of air defense continued throughout the Khrushchev
period until 1963, when the "bible" on Soviet military' strategy appears. This was V. D.
Sokolovskiy's Soviet Military Strategy.^^^^ Sokolovskiy's book offers some interesting
contrasts to Khrushchev's 1960 "new strategy" speech. In particular, the Soviet
military, unlike Khrushchev, was concerned about how to actually fight and win a
future war, not just deter it through nuclear sabre-rattling, bluff, and bluster,
Sokolovskiy thus insisted that the final victory in war could be assured only through
the combined action of all arms and services. As part of this formulation then, he and
those with whom he wrote saw "continued uses for tactical and fighter aviation, and a
growing importance for the role of reconnaissance" aircraft in a future war.^^'* This
formulation was both a return to more traditional Soviet militar>' views, as well as a
"corrective" whose purpose was to realign Soviet air doctrine with its actual and
^-°Lee, The Soviet Air Force, pp. 109-120.
Lee, The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, p. 126.




^''•^V. D. Sokolovskiy. Voennaya Straiesiya. Translated by the Rand Corporation
as Sovie Military Strategy (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1963).
Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy, p. 54.
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emerging capability. To this end, air doctrine was reoriented from strictly air defense
to include other missions, such as reconnaissance and ground attack. Nevertheless, the
impact of the recently-acquired air defense-oriented technology continued to influence
Soviet doctrine.
Especially since the enunciation of "Flexible Response" by the Kennedy
Administration, the Soviets perceived an increased emphasis placed on tactical air
power by American and NATO planners. The Soviet response came in the form of air
defense:
Because of the fact that tactical air forces "in many armies are one of the main
means for deliverins nuclear weapons, air defense troops are becoming
increasinsly important to the eround forces .... It is more miportant that the
fighters oT the air defense have""the tactical and technical qualities, and the missile
and electronic equipment, to enable them to reliably destrov enemv aerial targets
at any altitude and at ranges that will protect the troops from enerhy air attacks
.... the role and miportance of the National PVO have increased
immeasurablv .... Fighters will evidently play a considerable role in the
National PVO svstem in the coming vears. 'By increasing their speed, altitude,
and range, and by improving their missiles and radar, fiehters can continue to
combat enemv bombers successfuUv. A modern air defense fighter must be able
to remain aloTt for a pro-longed period, execute radar patrols, and shoot down
enemy aircraft at anv altitude.
But Sokolovskiy also defended the ground attack role and Soviet ability to execute it:
Tactical fiehters and fiehter-bombers will obviously still be able to support
ground troops on the battlefield effectively .... their speed and altitude must
surpass those of enemy aircraft. Front hrie aircraft can be particularlv effective
in destroying enemy nuclear weapons, especially missiles, on the battlefield.
Aircraft stillliave the important mission of aerial'reconnaissance for all brances
of the armed forces .... Hence reconnaissance aircraft and instruments of aerial
reconnaissance are continually being improved with respect to their ability to
detect enemy targets traveling at high speeds and altitudes at any time of day' and
in any weather.
Ultimately, Soviet force planners were able to generate political support for the
reconnaissance and ground attack roles, both a motivating force for and a consequence
of MIG's FOXBAT program and SUKHOI's new ground attack FITTER designs. By
the end of the Khrushchev period then,
^^^Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy, pp. 344-345.
^^^Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy, p. 347.
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the basic integritv of the ground forces and their supporting tactical air
armies—which together comprised the combat backbone of^ the theater
forces-was kept intact, and the validity of the .combined arms doctrine under
which they operated was emphatically reindorsed.
The ten years from Stalin's death were a period of transition from the
employment concepts of World War II to new concepts, which would ultimately find
expression in the theater nuclear offensive. The early, post-Stalin years, however, were
characterized by confusion, uncertainty, and ambivalence. One ver>' strong theme,
however, was that of the importance of air defense, stimulated in large meausre by the
growing ability of the MIG 0KB to deliver increasingly capable air defense fighters.
As the period progressed, Soviet planners came to see the force imbalance that had
come of the earlier, disproportionate improvement in air defense. Eventually, air
doctrine reemphasized reconnaissance and ground attack, as well as air defense. By the
end of the period then, employment concepts began to refiect the possibility of
combining nuclear weapons with traditional combined arms doctrine.
C. 1964-1973, THE NUCLEAR PERIOD
The Soviet theater nuclear offensive, which predominated in the 1964-1973
period, was characterized by the following two propositions: nuclear weapons play the
leading role in Soviet theater warfighting capability; escalation is considered highly
likely. That is, the Soviet strategy in this time period called for an in-depth, massive,
surprise nuclear strike, in conjuction with an immediate high-spee"d air and ground
exploitation.^^^ Soviet military' doctrine had changed since the 1950's in that the
Soviets allowed for the possibility of an "opening conventional phase . . . that
subsequently escalates to all-out intercontinental war."^^^
The Soviets' dominant preference in the 1960's was to be able to fight and win a
nuclear war in Europe. A "nuclear-oriented Soviet theater doctrine . . . had, as it were,
acquired a new lease on life."^^^
^^^Wolfe, Soviei Power, p. 147.
^^^See Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, \TI6).
^^^Douglass, Nuclear Offensive, p. 11.
^^°Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 458.
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The Soviet emphasis in the mid- to late-1960's on theater nuclear war is reflected
in the number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) deployed opposite
NATO at that time. "By about 1965, the Soviets had over 600 1R;MRB\I
(intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missile) launchers deployed" and close to
1,000 by 1970.^-^^ This is the force that would execute the initial nuclear fire barrage
(or mass strike) that would have taken place in a Soviet theater nuclear ofTensive.^-^^
The second part of such an offensive was to be "rapid exploitation by the ground
forces." In fact, "the real heart of the Soviet [theater nuclear offensive was] the ground
forces . . . what might be called the exploitation forces."^ -^-^ The importance of the
ground forces in the theater nuclear offensive r-eflected the previously-mentioned return
to the long-held Soviet preference for combined-arms operations, which had briefly
been eclipsed in the Khrushchev years.
The US policy of "Flexible Response," formally adopted during the Kennedy
Administration, admitted the possibility of a conventional phase to a European war,
but it was based on the assumption of Western military superiority at both the
intercontinental and theater-nuclear levels of war. Given this superiority, the West
could tolerate inferiority in conventional forces because NATO always retained the
flexibility to escalate to a higher level of conflict where dominance (superiority) would
be restored. This helps explain why the Soviets perceived escalation in a European was
as "inevitable." The Soviet response was to prepare for that escalation; the result was
the-operational concept for the theater nuclear ofTensive.
Instead of facing the untenable situation of having only a massive nuclear
response to a theater-level nuclear war, the Soviets refined their doctrine and their
capabilities for waging war under new conditions. Unlike the US, which did no more
than declare its need to be able to fight on "any rung of the escalation ladder,"^^'^ the
Soviets identified early in their debate the essential nature of deterrence and
^^J.Miller, Quest for Superiority, p. 83. Also, Robert P. Berman and John C.
Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookmgs Institution, 1982), p. 136
f v e
-
^^^Douglass, Nuclear Offensive, p. 45.
^^^ Further, "the ground forces, in effect, support or complete the work of the
nuclear strike." Douglass, i\uclear Offensive, pp. 4o-48.
^-^"^Jeffrev Record, NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Program: The
Real Issues (Washington, D.C.: Corporate Press, Inc., 1981). pp. 16-36. Record
charges that NATO has failed to establish an operational doctrme for theater nuclear
weapons-a failure that he claims persists to this day.
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war-fighting. For instance, writing in Voennaya Mysl', two theoreticians wrote in 1968:
A position which in our view is erroneous on the theoretical level and harmful on
the practical level is that which, counts only on the possibility of preventins war
and Ignores its being unleashed.
It was in large measure the Soviet concern for a genuine nuclear war-fighting capability
that generated the requirement for the theater nuclear offensive. This is not to say that
the Soviets wanted a war in Europe, let alone a nuclear war. It is simply that
Soviet doctrine and militarv posture do not distinguish between deterrent and
warfishting nuclear capabilities . . . the better the Soviet armed forces are
prepa^red to fisht and wm a nuclear war, the more eOective thev will also be as a
deterrent to an attack on the Soviet Union; at the same time, the abilitv of Soviet
forces to fight and win^a nuclear war provides indispensable msurance against the
failure of deterrence. ^•^^
Within the context of this increased need to fight a nuclear war, evolving Soviet
air employment concepts sought a way to use the aircraft currently in and entering the
inventory that would combine traditional combined arms precepts with tactical nuclear
weapons. As we have seen, these tended to be fast, high-fiying aircraft suited best for
the air defense mission, but included as well a recently-acquired (if limited) ground
attack capability. Other aircraft, such as the FLOGGER and the FOXBAT had some
limited fiexibility regarding their employment. For example, the FOXBAT, if it could
not be used against the US B-70 for which it was designed, could serve in a more
general air defense role, as well as serve as a high-altitude, high-speed reconnaissance
platform.
The air employment concept for the theater nuclear ofiensive emphasized ground
attack and reconnaissance missions. The latter included both pre- and post-strike
reconnaissance, as well as "armed strike reconnaissance" or "free hunt."^^^ The major
General Major N. Sushko and Lieutenant Colonel V. Kozlov, "The
Development of Marxist-Leninist Teaching on War and the Army," Voennaya Mysl\
April 1968, p. 95.
^^^Leon Goure; Foj D. Kohler; ani Mose L. Flarvev, The Role of Nuclear
Forces in Current Soviet Strategy (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies,
University of Miami, 1974), p. S:
. . . reconnaissance must now be conducted to a ver}^ ereat depth ....
Aviation can only support tank forces with timely information on the enemy by wide
use of the entire complex of modern photo and radiotechnical means, which permit
rapid and accurate transmission of reconnaissance information." Col. V. Kuznetsov
and Col. B. Andreyev, Selected Readings from 'Military Thought,' 1963-1973
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mission for frontal aviation was to locate and destroy mobile targets and to identify
"new or newly activated airbases."^^^ Aircraft were also envisioned as being especially
effective when combined with tank forces in deep offensive operations. ^'^
The theater nuclear offensive's initial fire barrage was a variation on "suppressive
terrain fire," an artiller>' employment concept that began to lose credibility in the wake
of the hard experience of Arab artillery- crews in the 1967 and 1973 wars.
Subsequently, the Soviets began to shift the focus of their tactical requirements, ending
the period of the theater nuclear offensive, and ushering in the theater strategic
conventional operation.
D. 1973-1985, THE CONVENTIONAL PERIOD
1. Introduction
The Soviets believe that the ever-present threat of uncontrolled escalation to
intercontinental nuclear war in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe,
as well as improvements in the capability of weapons of all types, particularly aircraft,
have made obsolete old forms of conducting warfare. More specifically, the Soviets
believe that with greater firepower, longer weapons ranges, faster response times due to
automation and computer-assisted decision-making, and with greater mobility, it is
increasingly necessar>' not only to take advantage of scientific and technological
developments in order to prosecute the offensive, but it is also increasingly urgent to
engage enemy forces (which themselves have increased range, mobility and lethality)
throughout the depth of the theater.
In fact, this evolution of weapons capability and its impact on militarv'
doctrine is nothing new. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, former Chief of the Soviet General
Staff, described in his 1985 book. History Teaches Vigilance, how the organizational
structure of armed forces has changed over the centuries. He notes the ever-greater
capability of weapons and the subsequent requirement that the organizing principle for
their use be changed to reflect more accurately the threat and the capability inherent in
the new technologies. He concludes by stating:
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1982), p. 127.
^^^Douglass, p. 67.
In combination with tactical and operational missiles, aircraft carrving nuclear
weapons were to "clear a path in a short time for tank groupings to swiftlv penetrate
into the operational depth of a resisting enemy." Kuznetsov and Andreye'v, Selected
Readings, p. 125.
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Thus, the creation of new weapons and new military equipment . . ..requires
corresponding changes in the methods of conducting military- operations.
2. The Theater Strategic Conventional Operation
The basic field command in the Soviet schema is the front. Presumably
because it was a wartime command, the front did not formerly exist in peacetime on a
day-to-day basis. The closest Western equivalent to a front is a NATO Army Group.
Several fronts comprise a Theater of Military' Operations (TVD). It is within the
context of these TVD's that the Soviets now do their combat planning, apparently
having listened closely to the arguments put forth by Marshal Ogarkov. The 1985
issue of the US Defense Department's 1985 Soviet Military Power says:
With the advent of longer ranee and more capable aircraft and missiles, coupled
with increased troop mobility and maneuverability, Soviet concepts for
employment of combmed arms' units and formations are evolvins accordinelv.
The Soviets believe that modern warfare would substantiallv exceed "the
framework of front operations. As a result, they envision a lareef scale military
operation, which they refer to as a theater strategic operation "^ . . . While the
Soviet concept of the front as a large combat formation in the field remains
essentially intact, the Soviets are now focusing on operations bv groups of
fronts.-'"^^
TVD's have in the past, as have fronts, been a wartime organization only.
However, in 1979 the Soviets appear to have established the Far Eastern TVD, a major
command reorganization probably intended to coordinate the activities of all the Soviet
armed forces opposite China and_to provide the structure in peacetime that would be
necessar>' for rapid conversion to a wartime footing. ^"^^ Since then, the Soviets have
estabUshed several peacetime TVD's. ^'^^
The significance of the peacetime estabUshment of TVD's is that it may
represent the "culmination of a long-standing effort" on the part of the Soviets to
streamline their command and control structure. ^^'^ In the past the wartime-only
existence of a TVD meant that its creation was indicative of impending hostihties (or
^"^^Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Oearkov, htoriya Uchit Bditel'nosti
(Historv' Teaches Vigilance) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1"985).
^'^^US Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power 1985 (Washington, D.C.:
US Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 15.
^'^^Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p. 13.
^'^^Soviet Military Power I9S5, p. 16. See also Jane's Defense Weekly (Surrey:
Jane's PubUshing Corripany Limited), 13 April 1985, pp. 623-624.
^'^'^Michael J. Deane, et al., "The Soviet Command Structure," Strategic Review,
Spring 1984, p. 66.
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at least that the Soviets perceived hostilities to be imminent). For the West, the
creation of a TVD may have served as a strategic warning indicator--now that warning
would no longer be available. In addition, however, the existence in peacetime of a
wartime organization streamlines planning and staff work, and eliminates the problems
attendant to passing command at a critical point in time.^"^^
Several TVD's comprise a Theater of War (TV). The US Department of
Defense (DOD) has identified at least three TV's: Western, Southern, and Far Eastern.
The Far Eastern TV appears to be much the same as the Far Eastern TVD; that is, the
CINC of the Far Eastern TV may be dual-hatted as the commander of the Far Eastern
TVD. A similar situation may exist for the Southern TV and the Southern TVD. The
Western TV, however, includes all three TVD's opposite NATO, as well as two oceanic
TVD's. Clearly, the commander of the Western TV would be in charge of a
tremendous number of forces. His command would include, according to the DOD: 98
Soviet maneuver divisions; 55 non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) maneuver divisions;
42,300 tanks; 33,165 artiller>', rocket launchers, and morters (over I'OOmm); 4,545
tactical aircraft; 1,120 naval combatants {excludes SSBN's); and 1,145 naval aviation
aircraft. ^^^ Thus, the Western TV is the Soviet Union's largest command.
When Marshal Ogarkov assumed new duties in September of 1984, it was
widely reported that he had been demoted for one or another transgression. This is
hard to believe. Ogarkov presided over the establishment of this new command
structure while he was Chief of the General Staff He had written about it and given
speeches on the topic; it is more likely that Ogarkov was never demoted. He may have
assumed command of the Western TV, which would explain Georgi Romanov's
comment in Helsinki 13 October 1984 that "Marshal Ogarkov commands the Soviet
Union's largest western force. "^"^^ In short, the most compelling argument is that after
writing about and arguing for reform in the Soviet command structure for several
years, and then presiding over the changes, Ogarkov was given the opportunity to
command the most important position in the new Soviet command structure.
^'^^Deane, "Soviet Command Structure," p. 66.
^"^^Soviet Military Power 1985, pp. 12-14.
^"^^Dusko Doder, "Ousted Soviet Chief of Staff Returns to Scene as Author,'
Washington Post, 10 June 1985, pp. 16-17.
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One of the most important reasons the Soviets changed their command and
control structure was to streamline it, to decrease response time in a crisis. Response
time is of critical importance when facing a nuclear threat. Until recently, the
dominant assumption in Soviet militar\" doctrine was that nuclear weapons would be
used in a European war—if not at the outset, then after a conventional phase of
uncertain duration. By 1977, though, when the Soviets began deploying the SS-20
IRBM in significant numbers, NATO no longer had dominance at the theater level.
Since then, Soviet doctrinal writings, which had previously assumed that a war would
go nuclear because NATO would escalate, have maintained that a European conflict
would not necessarily be nuclear. ^"^^ Nevertheless, he does not rule out a nuclear
option, for whatever plans the Soviets have for defeating NATO without nuclear
weapons, they surely plan for the contingency that NATO wiD escalate.
In fact, this is a concern that Joseph Douglass addressed when he discussed
the theater nuclear olTensive. He identified as a major problem for the Soviets the
issue of when and how to transition from conventional to nuclear war.^"*^ This problem
remains and, as a result, the Soviets plan to destroy or degrade NATO's nuclear,
tactical air and, command and control assets as early in the war as possible. It would
fall to the TVD or TV commander to coordinate these diverse combat operations, and
in the event, to resolve the dilemma of
abandoning a conventional advantage too soon and not exercising a nuclear
option too tardilv .... Contrarv to the popular notion of an automatic
escalation process^ Soviet militan." writings convev serious attentiqn^to a strict set
of militar}' preconditions . . . surrounding the decision to escalate. ^^
As CINC of the Western TV, Marshal Ogarkov may be responsible for the
command and control of Soviet escalation strategy:
[the] overall oraanization of their high command is now optimised for the
conduct of the "non-nuclear strategic deep offensive. [Although there] is little
doubt that the final and explicit authorization to use nucleaf weapons comes
"Conventional war now seems to be the norm, nuclear war the exception."
James M. McConnell. The Soviet Shift in Emphasis from Nuclear to Conventional: The
Mid-term Perspective (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analvsis, 1983), CRC 490, Vol. II,
p. 27.
^"^^Douglass, Nuclear Offensive, p. 94.
^^^Dennis M. Gormlev and Douslas M. Hart, "Soviet Views on Escalation," The
Washington Quarterly, Fall 1984, pp. 80-81.
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from the Defence Council ... the hineeing of the entire process of nuclear
escalation . . . [on the CIXC of the Western TYliShould guarantee a relatively
smooth transfer from non-nuclear to nuclear war.
To summarize this portion of the argument, it is clear that the realignment of
the Soviet command structure is significant for a variety of reasons. One is that it puts
the Soviets on a wartime footing in peacetime, which both deprives NATO of an
important strategic warning indicator of impending hostilities and also decreases Soviet
response time in dealing with crisis situations. Another is that it may provide a focal
point for the problems associated with nuclear escalation. Most important for this
argument, however, is that the newly-established TVD's and TV's are the command
echelons for the exploitation of the newest military technologies, including advanced
tactical fighter aircraft. That means that these new combat formations can more
effectively make use of greater firepower, longer ranges, greater lethality, and greater
mobility. These new command echelons can swiftly execute operations to a depth in
the enemy's rear area that could not previously be done by a combined arms
commander.
3. The Operational Maneuver Group
An important adjunct to these changes in command and control is the renewal
of interest in high-speed exploitation forces. The Operational Maneuver Group
(OMG) as an outgrowth of the World War II Mobile Group, is designed to energize
the attack and "raise the tempo of the advance. "^'^ If a Soviet commander were able to
move a large force, such as an OMG, deep into enemy territor>' early in the offensive
(D+ 1 or D + 2), he would not only make it very difficult for NATO to employ nuclear
weapons, but would himself threaten those weapons. The US Department of Defense
(DOD) believes the OMG attempts to "impose a theater-wide 'deep battle' and place
NATO in just such an untenable position. ^^-^ The widespread improvement and
expansion in Soviet helicopter forces provides potential OMG forces with a significant
^^Wossef Bodansky, "Ogarkov Confirmed as Western Theater C-in-C," Jane's
Defence Weeklv, 22 Octooer 1984, p. 716. See also Bodansky, Jane's Defence Weekly,
17 August 1985, p. 304.
^ j. ^ j-.
^
^^Christopher Donnelly, "Soviet Operational Concepts in the 1980's " supporting
paper to the European Security Study in Strengthening, Conventional Deterrence in
Europe: Proposals for the I9S0's'{Boston: NinirocT Press,! 983), pp. 105-136.
^^^Soviet Military Power 1985, p. 71.
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increase in mobility. ^^'^ This application of modern technology helps solve a genuine
problem for the Soviets—achieving rapid conventional success under the constant threat
of nuclear escalation. ^^^ Further, if the OMG is taken from the assets of the second
echelon, NATO may find its attacks against "foUovi'-on forces" and the second echelon
to be in vain.
The appearance of the Operational Maneuver Group clearly represents a
significant departure for the Soviet ground forces, which have, since the development
of tactical nuclear weapons, been structured and prepared for an "echeloned" battle in
Europe. Echelonment provided a way for the Soviets to cease concentrating men and
material, and thereby reduce NATO's temptation to strike with nuclear weapons and
to reduce the effects of any enemy nuclear fire. Instead of advancing on a broad front
and several days later finding, assigning, and executing an operational breakthrough,
the Soviets are increasingly interested in achieving their objectives quickly enough to
present NATO with a fait accompli.
The Soviets have moved in this direction, despite their prior readiness to
execute a theater nuclear offensive, because they
believe it would be difficult to control escalation once the weapons have been
used, and therefore thev would hope to win without recourse to the nuclear
option. In the Soviet view the abihty to control the course and outcome of a
conflict employing nuclear weapons is. at best, uncertain. The Soviets seek to
reduce the uncertainty , by managing the degree of freedom of the threat, i.e.,
NATO's nuclear forces. ^
The purpose behind the energized attack and advance envisioned by the use of
such devices as OMG's is to impose a train of events on NATO faster than NATO can
respond, deny NATO time to mobilize, reduce logistics problems for Warsaw Pact
forces, and impose minimum damage on captured territor>'.^^^ As an illustration of
^ At "Army level about 20 attack regiments have been formed, with up to 60
Hip and Hind attack helicopters each." Soviet Military Power 1985, p. 64. The
International Institute for Strategic Studies' The 1985-1986 Military Balance (pp.
188-191) also savs that at Army level there is a helicopter regiment with 40 MI-24
Hind and 24 MI-8 Hip hehcopters. In addition, tank ana motorized rifle divisions each
have a helicopter squadron with six each of Hind and Hip.
^^^Phillip A. Peterson and John G. Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet
Theater Strategy," Orbis, Fall 1983, p. 721.
Donnelly, Strengthening Deterrence, p. 45.
Donnelly, Strengthening Deterrence, p. 46.
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how efTective the proper execution of the OMG's mission could be, a front-level OMG
(committed on the first day of fighting and right behind the leading edges of the first
echelon), could seriously disrupt NATO nuclear release procedures. I'igure 35, depicts
the request sequence for nuclear release authority and its attendant time lapse.
:;/Li':.y^: '-y^^:f.. REQUEST SEQUENCE^
Source: Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 (1977). Quoted in
Record, Force Modernization, p. 3:).
Note: This chart is the best available representation of this request sequence.
It may not be completely accurate, but it serves to illustrate the general
problem of nuclear release procedures for NATO.
Figure 35. Request Sequence to Fire Nuclear Artillery
It should be clear that, depending on the success of the OMG (and it is by not
means certain that the OMG will be successful), it is possible that large, tank-heavy
operational raiding forces will be in action deep inside NATO's tactical defenses well
before NATO can even decide to respond with nuclear weapons. This use of the OMG
represents a sharp departure from past Soviet combat capabilities, in terms of combat
formations, depth of mission, and its form of maneuver.
^^^The Soviets have developed two new structures of approximately corps size,
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4. The Soviet Air Forces Reorganization
Closely related to both the changes in command and control structures and
the development of the OMG is the reorganization of the Soviet Air Forces. In order
to understand the significance of the reorganization, it is necessar>' first to know how
the Soviet Air Forces (SAF) were organized prior to the current rationalization.
Reorganization is not new to the SAF. At the beginning of World War II the
SAF was comprised of five parts: Long-Range Bomber Aviation; Reserves of the
Supreme High Command (VKG); Frontal Aviation; Army Aviation; and Troop
Aviation. The confusion that resulted during the opening phases of the war between
the USSR and Nazi Germany led the Soviets to simplify their Air Forces into two
branches. These were Long-Range Aviation (LRA) (subordinated to the VGK), and
the Tactical Air Armies (assigned to the fronts). ^^^ This arrangement continued until
the late 1970's. Beginning in the late 1970's, the Soviets disbanded LRA and the
Tactical Air Armies, and restructured part of PVO Strany. Since then, all LRA
(bombers)' and some Frontal Aviation (tactical) aircraft were organized into five new
Strategic Air Armies. The rest of the Frontal Aviation assets and nearly half of PVO
Strany's interceptor force were combined into Air Forces of the Military' District or
Group of Forces. Finally, the helicopters that had been part of Frontal Aviation were
separated and reformed into an organization now called Army Aviation. ^^"^
The current organization of the SAF goes a long way toward helping the
Soviets achieve a capability for a successful conventional offensive in Euripe. In part,
this capability is a function of new technology, but the reorganization is also an
attempt to "develop and implement new operational concepts."^ ^^ There is a "pleasing"
symmetry evident between the SAF reorganization and the likely concept for Soviet air
employment in a war against NATO and the restructuring of the combined arms
which are ideal for the OMG mission. DOD says these new corps "contain in excess of
450 tanks, 600 infantry vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and 300 artillerv pieces
and multiple rocket launchers .... Additional units of this type are expected to be
formed once testing and evaluation are completed." Soviet Military Power 1985, p. 63.
^^^These Tactical Air Armies came to be called Frontal Aviation.
^^^Soviet Military Power, p. 81.
^^^"Until Soviet Frontal Avaiation began to receive its current generation of
aircraft, a Soviet air operation aeainst NATO air and nuclear assets would probablv
have been ineffective. Soviet tactical aircraft of the 1 960 'swere characterizea bv ligh't
bomb loads and short ranee. But over the last decade, Soviet units and even units" of
the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states, have been equipped with increasinely
more capable and sophisticated aircraft." Phillip A. Petersen, "Reorganization Trends,"
Murphy, Soviet Air Forces, p. 267.
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command and control structure discussed earlier. That is, the Soviets realize that the
role of a particular TVD may change during the course of a war and that the shifting
of air power between theaters acquires significant importance. Petersen suggests that
in the Western USSR (possibly that geographic area under the control of the CIXC of
the Western TV) two Strategic Air Armies, normally subordinated to the VGK, could
be "allocated" to both the Western and Southwestern TVD's, "with a variable
percentage of the longer-range bombers [in another Strategic Air Army] swinging to
whichever TVD was perceived by the Supreme High Command [VGK] to have the
greatest requirement. "^^^
To reconstruct just precisely which air assets would go where, it is necessarv^
to determine which aircraft are in which Air Army. DOD makes it clear that the five
Strategic Air Armies of the VGK currently contain the following aircraft: TU-95
BEAR, M-4 BISON, TU-22M BACKFIRE. TU-16 BADGER, TU-22 BLINDER, and
SU-24 FENCER.^^^ It is also possible that some of these Air Armies control fighter
and reconnaissance aircraft. ^^'^ DOD also suggests that the BEAR and BISON aircraft
are combined into a single Air Army designed for intercontinental and maritime strikes.
Given the intercontinental nature of these missions, it is likely that this would be the
Moscow Air Army.^^^ It is clear from other sources that the two Air Armies DOD
refers to as being comprised entirely of former Frontal Aviation assets are the Legnica
and Vinnitsa Air Armies. ^^^ These are the "FENCER Air Armies."^^*^ The Smolensk
Air Army "controls about 12 bomber bases in the Western Soviet Union, with
BACKFIRE, BADGER, and BLINDER assigned."^^^ Finally, the Irkutsk Air Army in
the Soviet Far East may control BACKFIRE, BADGER and FENCER aircraft.^^^ By
Col. Yu. Bryukhanov, "The Massed Employment of Aircraft," Voemiaya Mysl',
June 1969. Quoted in Petersen, "Reorganization Trends," pp. 277 and 340.
^^^Soviet Military Power, p. 33.
^^'^Petersen, "Reorganization Trends," p. 276.
^^^Petersen, "Reorganization Trends," p. 282.
^^^Petersen, "Reorganization Trends," p. 282. See also the International Institute
for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1985-1986, vp. 26-27 and William M. Arkin
and Richard W. Fieldhouse. !\uclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race
(Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 263 and 267.
^^"^Soviet Military Power, p. 34.
^^^Arkin and Fieldhouse, Global Links, p. 261.
^^^Arkin and Fieldhouse. Global Links, p. 255. It is unlikelv that the Irkutsk Air
Army controls BEAR or BISON aircraft, as Arkin and Fieldhouse indicate. Soviet
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dividing up their strategic air assets in this manner, the Soviet would be able to
"provide support for specific theaters of military operations [TVD's] and to assure the.
flexibility to reallocate aircraft as necessar>' during wartime."^ ^^
While Soviet strategic air assets can apparently be subordinated from the
VGK down to the TV or even the TVD levels, the Air Forces of the Military Districts
and the Groups of Forces are designed primarily to be used by the front commander,
as frontal aviation.^^^ These aircraft would execute a wide range of missions, including
air defense cover, reconnaissance, ground support, and interdiction. These valuable
contributions notwithstanding, the Soviets understand air superiority to be an
absolutely essential condition for victor>' in war. The Soviets, therefore, intend to
attain air superiority through the execution of a theater-wide strike of massive
proportions at the ver\' outset of a war in Europe. Because this air operation would be
so critical to the Warsaw Pact's success,
[mostj, if not all, of the aviation assigned to the combined arms fronts [i.e., the
Air Forces of the VliUtary Districts, GOF] in a siven theateu^ of militar>'
operations must initially support the overall theater air'^operationj.
The requirement that front-level fixed-wing aircraft participate in the
theater-wide air operation at the beginning of the war deprives the maneuver
formations of their support for an indefinite period of time. As a result, the Soviets
have greatly expanded the role of helicopters, separating them from the former Frontal
Aviation organization, and aggregating them together into the newly formed Army
Aviation. There are a variety of reasons that the Soviets prefer helicopters over
high-performance fixed-wing aircraft for the "close air support" mission. These include
Military Power 1985, makes clear that only one Air Army is designed for
intercontinental strike, and it is more reasonable to suppose that it is the Moscow Air
Army that has this responsibiUty. In addtion, it is possible, since there are FENCER'S
in the Far East, that Irkutsk controls some of these relatively new tactical bombers,
performing in the Far East the functions of the Smolensk, Legnica and Vinnitsa Air
Armies in the West.
^'^^Soviet Military Power 1985, p. 33.
^^^ Military Districts and Groups of Forces typically become fronts in time of
war.
^^^Petersen and Hines, "Conventional Offensive," p. 713.
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fewer logistics problems, deployment closer to the forward edge of the battle area, and
improved capability to conduct reconnaissance. In addition, like fixed-wing aircraft,
helicopters can both concentrate and disperse rapidly.^^-^
Overall, the SAF reorganization has resulted in a command and control
structure for air assets which makes them more responsive to requirements at ever\'
command echelon. At the strategic level (greater than 500 km) the VGK, TV, and
TVD commands have long-range air assets that can be used to execute the air
operation at the outset of a war, and can later be progressively "allocated" to
subordinate commanders on critical axes of advance within the theater of military-
operations. At the operational levels {100 km to 500 km), front commanders have
fixed-wing air assets which will probably be relinquished to higher authorities at the
outset of a war, but which, after the air operation, will be "returned" for the support of
front level objectives. In addition, the front commander now has control not only of
fomer Frontal Aviation tactical aircraft, but also a large number of former PVO Strany
air defense interceptors. These can be used to enhance the front's air defenses when
necessary', as well as perform other missions, such as limited ground attack and
reonnaissance. In the meantime, the front's subordinate combat maneuver formations
will not have been without air support; at the tactical level (up to 100 km), division.
army and front commanders have a great many attack helicopters (and perhaps
eventually get the SU-25 FROGFOOT ground support fighter) in the new Army
Aviation organization.
Soviet writers frequently extol the virtues of aerial fire support. They
recognized that the command and control structure that existed prior to about 1980
was not flexible or responsive enough to meet the needs of their evolving operational
concepts. Specifically, the old LRA structure was too cumbersome to accomplish the
important missions in depth that might suddenly arise during combat, such as
destroying recently discovered enemy nuclear weapons or concentrations of enemy
aircraft. Also, the previous generation of fighters and fighter-bombers did not have the
range or payload capability to effectively establish fire superiority in general, or air
"In order to free aviation of the front to participate in deep attacks in a
theater of military operations, helicopters would nave to assume much of the
responsibility for aerial fire support of the ground forces. The resurrection of 'armv
aviation' sugeests that the Soviets have found a solution to the problems involved in
conducting "deep-theater strikes in support of the TVD objectives while at the same
time provTdine direct air support to the ground forces." Petersen, "Reorganization
Trends," p. 274.
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superiority in particular. The realignment of air assets, such as FENCER and
BACKFIRE, into Air Armies of the VGK centralized their control and
made it possible to broadly maneuver aviation, to quickly create powerful
aviation groupinss on the major, strategic sectors, and sharply alter the ratio of
forces in Tavor ofSoviet aviation.
Centralized control also eases the airspace management problem. The subordination
of former PVO interceptors to front commanders is a recognition that offense and
defense in the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) are too intimately related to
each other to be separated administratively. It may also represent a growing
appreciation for the exceedingly high cost of "single-mission aircraft" and the gradual
development of Soviet aircraft design to the point where a particular airframe may
effectively perform multiple missions.
Finally, the development of Army Aviation is clearly an attempt to redress the
organizational absence of a necessary combat capability: that of providing direct,
closely controlled, responsive ground support to maneuver formations. Combined
arms commanders now have dedicated air assets organized in a structure that closely
resembles the wartime structure of the ground forces themselves.
The reorganization has been driven by the increased ranges, accuracy, and
speed of weapons—not only was it possible to deliver strikes at tremendous depth and
with impressive accuracy, but it also became increasingly urgent to do so because the
adversary' had much the same capability. The reserve Air Armies of the VGK are
created from former LRA and some former Frontal Aviation assets. They are
specifically designed to provide flexible firepower to TV/TVD combined arms
commanders and, when they can be spared, to front commanders who need the extra
air support because their advance lies on the theater's main axis of advance.
Army Aviation is made of the old Frontal Aviation helicopters and possibly
the SU-25 FROGFOOT ground support fighter. Army Aviation appears to allocate to
front commanders two regiments of attack helicopters; armies now have one such
N, Daaavev and V. Chernitskiy, "Trends in the Development of the
Organizational Forms of Frontal and Lone-Ranee Aviation During the Great Patriotic
War," Voyenno-htoricheskiy Zhurnal, Octooer 19S0.
88
regiment assigned, and motorized rifle and tank divisions each have a squadron of
helicopters assigned. These are organic fire support units, dedicated to the close air
support mission.
Aircraft which previously had been controlled only at the national level (such
as BACKFIRE) appear now to be "available" to the combined arms commander at the
TV/TVD level, significantly increasing the reach of aerial firepower in the theater of
war and the theaters of military' operations. Also, the maneuvering of air assets from
one TVD to another, between levels of command (such as would be the case when a
TVD commander appropriates tactical air assets from his subordinate front
conunanders to carry out theater-level objectives), and between fronts themselves, is
much easier. The principle is that each command echelon has its own "dedicated" air
assets that can be used in support of "unique" combat objectives, however, a superior
commander has the authority to requisition aircraft to accomplish the objectives of a
higher command echelon, or to adjudicate the disputes that would inevitably arise
between coordinate commands as to the additional air assets to which they are entitled.
For example, a TVD commander would determine if one of his subordinate front
commanders, operating on a secondary axis within the TVD, should relinquish his air
assets to an adjacent front, which lies on the main axis of advance and is in a
breakthrough position. Another form of maneuver is that envisioned by transferring
the assets of an entire Air Army from one TVD to another. An example might be the
deployment of Vinnitsa Air Army assets from the Southwestern TVD (opposite
Turkey, Greece, and Italy) to the Western TVD (opposite Germany), where they would
augment the efforts of the Legnica Air Army.
5. The Air Operation
Throughout the period during which the theater nuclear offensive was the
dominant operational concept for continental land warfare, the Soviets were compelled
to keep their forces dispersed. This was one of the purposes of echelonment, the first
echelon of which was essentially the nuclear strike itself The rapid development of
aircraft and missile capability permitted replacement of the nuclear fire barrage with a
conventional fire plan whose effects would be great enough to both neutralize NATO's
air assets and destroy NATO's nuclear weapons, thus establishing general fire
superiority over NATO. The vehicle for the conventional fire plan is the "air
operation," the post-WW II effectiveness of which was demonstrated in the 1967 Israeli
strike on Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian airfields at the outset of the Six-Day War.
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The air operation is expected to last several days. During that period, there
would be only limited ground support available to maneuver formations, while most
fixed-wing assets (except those on nuclear-withhold) would be engaged in phased wave
attacks on NATO airfields, nuclear storage, and command and control facilities. The
device for reducing aircraft losses in NATO's air defense environment is the "air
corridor;" one or two of which would be established per front.^^^ These penetration
corridors would be created through the execution of a highly structured series of
phased attacks on NATO's air defense system. These integrated attacks would be
made against radars, missile sites, airfields, and command and control facilities, and
would include extensive stand-ofT-, escort-, and self-protection jamming and electronic
deception. The progression of the attack after the first waves would be highly
dependent on tactical reconnaissance and battle damage assessment. After the
corridors are opened and NATO's air and nuclear assets have been sufiiciently
neutralized to prevent escalation and blunting of the Warsaw Pact ofTensive, fixed-wing
assets would be progressively released back to the fronts for ground support duties and
front-level objectives. Because the Soviets realize that 50 percent of NATO's firepower
rests with NATO air assets, successful execution of the air operation is necessar>' for
establishing fire superiority early in the war and is, in fact, the linchpin of current
Soviet doctrine. With a thorough look at the evolution of both Soviet fighter design
and Soviet air employment doctrine now complete, we can turn to a more rigorous
analysis of the interaction between the two. That effort is undertaken in the next
section.
Col. Aleksander Musial, "The Character and the Importance of Air
Operations in Modern Warfare," Polish Air and Air Defense Review, 1982, p. 12.
Suoted in Phillip A. Petersen and Major John R. Clark, "Soviet Air and Antiair
perations," Air University Review, March-April 19S5, Vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 36-54.
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V. QUANTIFYING THE PROBLEM
A. THE COMPONENTS OF FIGHTER CAPABILITY
This section of the thesis seeks to quantify the evolution of Soviet fighter aircraft
technology and air employment doctrine. The purpose is to more systematically and
objectively measure their covariation and assess their relationship to each other. Of
the 80 variables in the data base, 10 were chosen for the factor analysis. These 10
variables, presented in Table I (next page), appeared in earlier explorations of the data
to best describe the evolution of fighter technology. ^^^ They have the virtue of
reflecting the importance of the weapons and avionics suites, rather than just the
physical characteristics of the airframe and its propulsion system. The design of the
aircraft itself is important, to be sure, but, as was shown earher, the most significant
changes to date in that area were the adoption of the swept wing and jet propulsion in
the last days of the World War II and the immediate postwar years. Since then, the
biggest changes have been in the fields of weapons and aviation electronics (avionics).
Thus, this selection of ten variables is designed to illuminate precisely those areas
that have experienced the maximum growth and development over the past forty years.
The maneuverability variable, however, does capture a number of important features of
the airframe and its propulsion systern, and stands as an adequate surrogate for more
exact measures of maneuverability. ^^^ In addition, it seemed that these ten variables
would accurately describe the two basic dimensions of the Soviet fighter force, air
combat and ground attack. Finally, this particular combination resulted in the fewest
factors accounting for the maximum variation in the observations.
The purpose of this Q-factor analysis^*^^ was to identify two profiles of aircraft:
air combat (AA) and ground attack (GA). Characteristics common to AA fighters
should cluster together on an "AA dimension," while characteristics common to GA
See Appendix A for a more complete description of the data base.
1 77




Factor analysis applied to units (individuals, nations, aircraft, etc.) is Q-factor
analysis; the intent is to detect patterns of profile similarity. R-factor analysis, more
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aircraft should cluster together on a "GA dimension" at a right angle (orthogonally) to
the air combat fighters. Table II (next page) presents the correlation matrix input for
the factor analysis.
Table III (page 95) presents the estimates of communality, which describe the
variation in one variable that can be expected from the shared influence of all the other
92
TABLE II -
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR FIGHTER MATRIX (FTRMAT)
TRACK SEARCH HSLRANEE NUHBERftSLS :radius TURATIC MANEUVER ORDNANCE SUN: SI ^:iON_S
TRACK K >" ^- c ,w w w w .- 70£:: .4719; .:0E3- » *J 1 i.Z - t OuOD*" 1 . C-,
SEARCH .9934: 1 .O&OOr 91401 _ 7
'0 ••?••; ' *"' * c r
.
j'''£27 ' -nr '
1 u / u / - . 1 / V : "
! MSLRAN6E .90250 91401 : COOOO 7r7DC / j / T ; ocr " =^ _
.'. r r. • ."i
voazr .26:^4
i NUHBERHSLS
p F- r ^-t
7093'^ i.OOOCC 4e:'25 .4203: -
"-
J '^ _ £2930 40426
i CRADIUS 1 (' .'ww — 2
j f ;- 70^47
.40728 : oocoo _2'^cr'. _ .«JC r • -irr _ 426-1 29561
i THRATIO i?' S'j 50£27
* T' .'^ ? ? r /•, .- I-. i; 0127- - 25S6C - 0292J
! MANEUVER
i (*. !^ " -< 06659 -.0612E - ^ « w J.1 .60&32 1 V V -' '.' '.' 51296 ?7?Qr
1 ORDNANCE .1372E 12795 1£92'' OiJQ'^n C" nrr 5:23£ : 00000 - 10453 / b /
1
':




j' V *j S .•i.'T..i
,. ^ ^ - -
37395 7E719 - 03746 1. ujOiju
variables. Table IV (next page) presents the results of the factor delineation. It shows
that all of the variance can be accounted for by nine linear combinations of these
factors, and that over 82% can be accounted for by just three factors (factor matrices
in Tables V and VI, page 95).
The fmal varimax-rotated factor matrix in Table VI shows the three vectors and
their highest loadings. The first factor (Long Kill) is the long-range kill capability of
Soviet air combat fighters. One would expect a high positive correlation between the
derived variable (Long Kill), which would require long-range radar detection and
tracking, long-range AAM's and multishot capability, and high values for the variables
SEARCH, TRACK, MSLRANGE, and NUMBERMSLS. This factor alone accounts
for nearly half of the observed variance in Soviet fighter capability. It reflects the
long-standing Soviet penchant for ground-controlled intercept (GCI) vectoring of air
defense fighters for a single-pass shot and subsequent return to base. It also reflects
the more recent design of first-look, first-shot, beyond-visual-range (BVR) kill
capabilities.
The second derived factor (Ground Attack) loads most heavily on
ordnance-carr}'ing capability and the number of weapons pylons. Factor 2 accounts
for another 23% of the observed variance. Finally, Factor 3 loads heaviest on
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airframe and propulsion system, however, the number of guns loaded third-highest on
this factor so it has been labelled "Close Kill." The close kill capability of an aircraft is
in fact a function of its maneuverability, ability to accelerate, and the number and
quality of its short-range weapons, particularly its guns. This third factor, Close Kill,
describes that small- portion of the Soviet fighter force characterized by apparently
good abilities in hard-turning, close-in air engagements. While it corresponds to
"dogfight" capability, it remains to be seen if this latent capability will be exploited by
Soviet pilots and planners.
This factor analysis shows that there are actually three dimensions to Soviet
fighter capability: two of these relate to air combat (Long Kill and Close Kill); another
describes the ground attack role. This factor analysis will help define the framework
for the multi-attribute utility analysis of Soviet fighters and employment doctrine
presented next. It is clear that any such model should incorporate three elements:
long- and close-range kill in air-to-air combat, and ground attack capability.
B. SCORING SOVIET FIGHTER TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE
The multi-attribute utiUty analysis undertaken in this section uses the framework
developed by the factor analysis. The model here is specifically designed to emphasize
the growth in those performance characteristics highlighted by the factor analysis as
significant to particular mission orientations. In essence, each aircraft in the data base
was given a raw score according to the equation appropriate for its mission category.
That raw score was converted into a "technological index" by dividing it by the raw
score of the lowest-scoring aircraft in the same mission category (the baseline aircraft).
This index of embodied technology is not a measure of combat capability, per se. It
measures the relative position of aircraft in the same mission category' with respect to
the technical component of aircraft performance. This technical component is a source
of potential combat capability that may or may not be tapped by the pilot or the
planners who develop employment techniques. In any event, it is by no means
established that the technological level of a fighter aircraft is the best indicator of its
combat potential (this issue will be addressed in the final section of this thesis); it may
only be the most visible and measurable.
With this disclaimer, recall that long-range kill capability is characterized by
long-range air intercept radars, long-range missiles, and a multishot capability. This
combination of requirements is characteristic of Soviet air defense fighters assigned to
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the national air defense organization (PVO). These air defense fighters include the
SU-9 FISHPOT B, SU-11 FISHPOT C, SU-15 FL'AGON series (A, D, E and F),
MlG-25 FOXBAT A and E, and the MIG-31 FOXHOUND. The following equation
was used to derive a raw air combat score for these nine aircraft:
[(NUMBERMSLS)(MSLRANGE) + TRACK] CRADIUS = RAW SCORE
Each raw score was then divided by that of the baseline aircraft (SU-9 FISHPOT B) to
derive an index of incorporated air-to-air technology for these air defense interceptors.
Table VH presents these air combat technological index values (TINDEXA).
TABLE VII
TINDEXA VALUES FOR AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS
: AIRCRAFT TINDEXA
su- 9 FISHPOT B 1. GO
: SU- 11 FISHPOT C 1 , 46
: SU- 15 FLAGON A/D 2. 65
i su- 15 FLAGON E/F 3. 17
1 MIG-25 FOXBAT A 7. 51
! MIG -25 FOXBAT E 9. 77
1 MIG-31 FOXHOUND 58. 25
The second component of air combat capability is the close-in kill, characterized
by maneuverability and short-range weapons. This element was added to the basic
TINDEXA equation as follows:
{[(NUMBERMSLS) (MSLRANGE) + TRACK] + [MANEUVER + GUNS]} X
CRADIUS
This equation, which included both long-range and short-range kill capability, was used
to derive raw scores for all the other air-to-air fighters (air superiority) in the data base.










MIG-17 FRESCO A . 1.54
MIG-17 FRESCO B 1 .54
MIG-17 FRESCO C 1.78
MIG-17 FRESCO D 1.66
MIG-17 FRESCO E 2.89
MIG-19 FARMER A 1.91
MIG-19 FARMER B 2.02
MIG-19 FARMER C 2.02
MIG-19 FARMER D 1.82
MIG-19 FARMER E 3-15
MIG-21 FISHBED A 2.19
MIG-21 FISHBED C 2.30
MIG-21 FISHBED D 3.04
': MIG-21 FISHBED F 2.93
' MIG-21 FISHBED H • 6.07
MIG-21 FISHBED J 6.18
: MIG-21 FISHBED K 6.13
;
MIG-21 FISHBED L 6.03
: MIG-21 FISHBED N 6.19
!
MIG-23 FLOGGER A 23.62
;
MIG-23 FLOGGER B 24.36




Because most aircraft are able to function in a capacity outside of their primar}'
mission (however, poorly), ground attack aircraft have some small air-to-air capability.
As a result, TINDEXA scores were derived for all Soviet fighters in the data base, in
order to develop average TINDEXA values for each time period under consideration.
Figure 36 presents the postwar evolution of TINDEXA values, while Table IX shows
the average TINDEXA for each time period (page 100). These figures suggest that
while there were improvements in air combat capability in all periods, the greatest






























Figure 36. Evolution ofTINDEXA
TABLE IX
AVERAGE TINDEXA VALUES
19^5-1953 1954-1964 1964-1973 1973-1985
1 .89 4.16 5.15 21 .80
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The second dimension of Soviet fighter capability is the ground attack mission,
the most important indicators of which were shown to be ordnance-carr\'ing capability
(ORDNANCE) and number of weapons pylons (STATIONS). The latter is an
important addition to ORDNANCE because it represents the flexibility with which
various types of targets can be attacked, as well as the potential number of targets that
can be attacked. Also, because precision-guided munitions (PGM's) are so much more
accurate than "conventional" munitions, PGM-capable aircraft include a constant that
doubles the ORDNANCE contribution to their raw score. This considerably
understates the improvement force planners can expect when calculating damage done
by PGM's compared to older "dumb" bombs, so there is no threat of the raw scores or
the subsequent index values overstating the improvement in ground attack capability in
recent years. In additiion, sea-level maximum airspeed (MACHSL) and combat radius
(CRADIUS) were included to help describe the ground attack aircraft's survivability
and depth of operation, respectively. The ground attack equations were as follows:
if not PGM-capable:
[(ORDNANCE)(.01) + STATIONS] (MACHSL)(CRADIUS) = R.^W SCORE
if PGM-capable:
[(ORDNANCE)(.02) + STATIONS] (MACHSL)(CRADIUS) = RAW SCORE
Ground attack technological index values (TINDEXG) were derived in the same way
as TINDEXA values, except that the baseline aircraft was the SU-7 FITTER A. Table
X (page 101) presents these TINDEXG values.
As with the TINDEXA values, TINDEXG values were also calculated for the
air-to-air fighters. Figure 37 and Table XI show the evolution of TINDEXG and both
TINDEX averages in each time period (page 102). They show that the largest increase
in ground attack capabiUty came in Period III, during which time air combat capability
increased at its slowest rate. These values confirm that Period III can be characterized
as a "ground attack period," while Period IV can be characterized as an "air combat
period." The first Period, during which the MIG OKB was the sole designer of fighter
aircraft included in this study, was characterized by designs which fiew faster and
higher than their predecessors-primarily air defense fighters poorly uited to the ground
attack role. The second period's TINDEX values show continued improvement in air
combat capability, while the tenfold increase in TINDEXG reflects SUKHOI's reentrv'
into the design community, notably with the SU-7 FITTER ground attack series.
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•TABLE X
TINDEXG VALUES FOR GROUND ATTACK FIGHTERS
AIRCRAFT TINDEXG
SU-7 FITTER A 1.00
SU-7 FITTER B 2.00
SU-7 FITTER 2.00
SU-17 FITTER C 4.20
SU-17 FITTER D 8.42
SU-17 FITTER H 9.54
SU-17 FITTER K 9.54
SU-2M FENCER A 54.57
SU-2M FENCER B 54.57
SU-2n FENCER C 54.57
SU-24 FENCER D 54.57
SU-25 FROGFOOT
. 4.55
MIG-27 FLOGGER D 8.72
MIG-27 FLOGGER J 8.72
SUKHOI'sreentry into the design community, notably with the SU-7 FITTER ground
attack series.
An aircraft's depth of operation is captured in this study by combat radius
(CRADIUS), which measures the maximum distance from the aircraft's home base at
which it can carry out its combat mission and return to the base from which it took
off. This relationship of the locus of combat to the locus of basing is an important
measure of aircraft capability, but it says nothing about the type of mission the aircraft
is supposed to accomplish. A better indicator of the latter is the relationship of
combat radius to the depth of responsibility corresponding to the command echelon
that controls the aircraft. Thus, a ratio of unity means that the aircraft is capable of
operating at a distance that exactly corresponds tot eh controlling echelon's maximum
depth of responsibility. If this variable (DEPTHRATIO) is less than one, the aircraft
will constantly be under the control of the owning command. When the
DEPTHRATIO is greater than one, the aircraft will either "chop" to a higher echelon
of command (which would have a correspondingly greater depth of responsibility) or
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Figure 37. Cvolution of TINDHXG
TABLE XI
DISAGGREGATED TINDEX VALUES
1945-1953 1954-1964 1964-1973 1973-1985
GA .18 1.16 9-89 16.66
AA 1.89 4.16 5.15 21.80
exercise a degree of autonomy, and possibly initiative, greater than that of aircraft
operating within their command's depth of responsibility. Once DEPTH RATIO values
are established for each aircraft it is possible to average the scores for each period and









































The orientation of the DEPTHRATIO scale above makes clear that certain
missions must coincide with others if they are to be effective. For example, effective
close air support missions require correspondingly effective action in the battlefield air
superiority role. Similarly, effective offensive counterair (OCA) strikes in the absence
of ground support missions run the risk of rendering the "air war" irrelevant to the
outcome of the larger combined-arms battle. The most effective force development
demands a good mix of air combat and ground attack capabilities.
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TABLE XIII
DISAGREGGATED AVERAGE DEPTHRATIO VALUES BY PERIOD
19H5-1953 1954-1964 1964-1973 1973-1985
AA
.40 .54 1 .23 -1.71
GA 1.25 2.36 2.24
Seen in this light, Soviet fighter development has exhibited periods of gro^^th in
one or another dimension of this idealized force mix. The larger of the two
DEPTHRATIO values in each time period dictate the maximum depth of operation
the fighter force can undertake. The greater the disparity between the two values, the
greater the imbalance in the fighter force and its doctrinal orientation. For example, in
Period II, the ground attack component of the fighter force was able to undertake
close air support missions, but the air combat component was capable only of shallow
air defense missions. This would have left the ground attack missions without
protective top cover. Although air combat capability improved in each of the
follovraig period, it still did not keep up with the improvements in the ground attack
component.
In Period IV, the reorganization of the Soviet air forces slightly reduced the
DEPTHRATIO values for the ground attack component by resubordinating some
aircraft to higher command echelons (this has the effect of increasing the size of the
DEPTHRATIO denominator). In addition, the air combat DEPTHRATIO values
continued to increase, reducing still further the indicator of force imbalance. As this
trend continues, the Soviet fighter force will theoretically be increasingly capable,
technically, of carrying out effective mission (both air superiority and ground attack)
well beyond the FEBA.
Figure 38 (page 106). graphically illustrates the sharp disparity between Soviet
doctrinal requirments throughout the postwar period and the ability of the Soviet
fighter force to carry out such missions. The X- and Y-axes present ground attack and
air combat DEPTHRATIO values, respectively. The four curves correspond to the
doctrinal orientation of each of the four periods. They depict the requirement of
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values for the particular period. The straight lines depict actual fighter force capability
at the time {determined by the average AA and GA DEPTHRATIO values in that time
period). Perfect convergence between doctrine and capability would show up as an arc
(doctrine), whose ends are connected by a straight line (capability). Deficiencies in
capability (relative to doctrinal requirements) are shown as gaps between the arc's ends
and the capability line (and highlighted by brackets).
The first postwar period was one of Stalinist domination. The prevailing doctrine
of the period echoed Soviet World War II experience. In terms of air employment
doctrine, the Soviet said they intended to use air assets in a ground attack role. There
were envisioned no air actions independent of the ground forces' operations.
Technological development of the period, however, was not oriented toward ground
attack aircraft. In fact, the increasing wing sweep, lower aspect ratios and thinner
airfoil sections of Soviet fighters under development at the time were intended to
provide aircraft that flew higher and faster than their predecessors. They were clearly
optimized for the air defense role and had virtually no ability to execute ground attack
missions.
In the second period, after its reestabUshment, one of SUKHOI's first designs
was the SU-7 FITTER ground attack fighter. This aircraft remedied the serious
ground attack deficiency in Period I. In fact, ground attack capability improved so
much that an imbalance was created in the air combat dimension. Specifically, the
Soviets were now able to carr>' out ground attack missions at the FEBA, transforming
the Soviet fighter force from one oriented toward point air defense into one oriented
ostensibly toward offensive operations. But now there was a deficiency in the air
combat role, which was still restricted to air defense.
In Period III both air combat and ground attack capabilities improved. For the
first time, Soviet air combat capability moved out beyond the FEBA and into the
battlefield air superiority arena. Actual air combat capability, however, was just
slightly greater than would have been necessar>' to meet the doctrinal requirments of
the earlier period. Again, SUKHOI ground attack aircraft (SU-17 FITTER and SU-24
FENCER) "drove" the doctrinal requirements out still further, both reflecting and
ramifying the development in the 1960's of the Soviets' theater nuclear oOensive
concept, which married traditional Soviet combined-arms doctrine with the realities of
the modern nuclear battlefield. Since ground attack aircraft were now capable of
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Figure 38. Technology-Doctrine Convergence
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the battlefield air superiority role), Period III was characterized by an imbalanced
force, deficient in air combat capability.
The most recent period has seen a slight movement downward of doctrinal
requirments at the same time as the fighter force has seen an increase in air combat
capability. This simultaneous convergent movement has reduced the disparity between
doctrinal requirements and fighter force capability to its lowest point in the postwar
period. ^^^
The slight movement downward of doctrinal requirements was not, strictly
speaking, a reduction in Soviet visions for the scope and depth of air combat in a
future war. It reflects the reorganization of the Soviet air forces and the design of new
aircraft that "fill in" gaps left in the wake of the ver>' rapid postwar growth in ground
attack capability.
The reorganization of the Soviet air forces resubordinated, among others, some
of the aircraft with the greatest DEPTHRATIO values (the SU-24 FENCER) up to a
command echelon with a greater depth of responsibility than the command echelon at
which they had previously been controlled. This had the efTect of reducing the
DEPTHRATIO values for that aircraft, which explains part of the downward
movement. The other explanation lies in SUKHOI's design of the SU-25 FROGFOOT
close air support fighter. This aircraft is designed to operate at ver\' shallow depths (no
deeper than the FEBA) in dedicated support to the front-level ground forces. Since its
DEPTHRATIO value is unity, the average ground attack DEPTHRATIO for Period
IV was expected to decrease.
The most interesting element, however, of the fourth period's doctrine-technology
relationship is the increase in air combat technological sophistication, a large part of
which is due to the design of the SU-27 FLANKER. The SU-27, with a high
thrust-to-weight ratio, low wingloading, wing-body blending (for good
high-angle-of-attack performance), large internal volume (for good combat radius), as
well as a new advanced radar and AAM's, should confer on Soviet force planners and
pilots a much greater potential for effective air combat than they have had in the past.
The FLANKER'S DEPTHRATIO of 2.33 makes it a natural choice for escorting the
SU-24 FENCER in interdiction and deep strike missions. In fact, no other air combat
fighter is capable of performing this role.. Thus, the SUKHOI OKB has provided
^^^Period I. which DEPTHRATIO values of .40 and 0.0. must be considered to
have had an infinite deficiency, although the difference is less than that for Period IV.
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Soviet force planners with both the ground attack and air combat aircraft needed for
the deep strikes and ofiensive counterair missions of a theater-wide strategic
conventional operation, as well as the capability to execute the earlier theater nuclear
ofiensive.
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VI. TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE IN PERSPECTIVE
(A MIG on your tail is better than no MIG at all)
The analysis thus far has attempted to compare the most easily-observed
characteristics and performance figures for postwar Soviet fighters with the apparent
employment concept prevalent at the time of each fighter's design. The evolution of
these two phenomena can be depicted in tabular form, as shown in Table XIV.
TABLE XIV
EVOLUTION OF SOVIET FIGHTER DESIGN
AND AIR EiMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
riSHTEP. DE5ISN AIR EffPLQYKENT DOCTRINE
1945-19S3 air defense ground attack




' aabivalence in design
refelected in V6H
1964-1973 ground attack theater nuclear offensive,
.
ground attack, recce, role
:
of tactical air uncertain
j 1973-19B5 air cofibat theater conventional offensive
This figure simply captures in brief form what has already been argued in detail;
that Soviet fighter design has not only progressed largely independently of doctrinal
requirements, but in fact appears to have driven the development of tactical air
employment doctrine over the past forty years. Each period has been marked by a
divergence between force structure and doctrine. Doctrine has changed over the years
in order to incorporate the most advanced technical capability, without apparent
consideration given to the need for balance in the fighter force mix and its convergence
with employment doctrine. Figure 38 (page 106) depicts the direction and magnitude
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of various correctives, but thus far, the Soviets ultimately appear to be at the mercy of
technological innovation; their doctrine must continually react to it in order to
incorporate it, and later, the resulting force imbalance and capability-doctrine
divergence must be addressed.
This state of affairs, however, is an unfortunate one for threat assessment. It
represents a sort of good news/bad news situation: the good news for the West is that
Soviet technological development puts the cart before the horse and results in a
confused capability-doctrine relationship that could prove disastrous to the USSR in
time of war; the bad news is that periodically the Soviets correct the situation (only to
be faced again with the same cycle of events). "Where, then, does that leave us? What
other variables must be "factored in" to the problem? What will add to the context
within which Western analysts must consider the Soviet air threat? These questions
are dealt with in this final section.
A. GROUND ATTACK
The challenges faced by the Soviets in the ground attack arena are in many ways
the same problems any air force would face {i.e., the "reconnaissance-target
engagement cycle is the same); in other ways, the Soviets have some unique problems
posed by the nature of their doctrinal requirements and the stultifying effects of their
political culture.
An air force seeking to deliver firepower beyond the FEBA faces a considerably
more complex task than simply arming a "ground-pounder" and launching it on its
way. A ver\' large number of functions must be performed in the course of the
reconnaissance-target engagement cycle, no less for the Soviets than for anybody else.
In addition, the precise nature of these functions will change slightly depending upon
the depth of the proposed mission. For example, a deep strike may require escort or
aerial refueling, while a close air support mission may require real-time coordination
with friendly air defense units and deconfiiction with friendly artiller>' and air assets in
the immediate vicinity of the proposed attack. Figure 39 (next page) depicts the wide
range of components possible in a modern ground attack mission.
Because not ever>'thing in combat can be predicted and preplanned, provision
must be made for ascertaining the "true state of the battlefield" at any given time. This
information is typically provided by reconnaissance and intelligence assets to the
commander, who in turn generates commands to pursue certain objectives at the
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GROUND-BASED CONTROL CENTERS & PARTIES ^a^ ^^rib'^^^S^
Source: Seymour J. Deitchman, Military Power and the Advance of Technology,
(Boulder, Wcstview Press, 1983), p. 41.
Figure 39. Components of a Modern Ground Attack Mission
111
Reconnaissance of potential targets can come from many sources, including
ground patrols and a wide range of reconnaissance (recce) platforms (e.g., dedicated
reconnaissance aircraft, other friendly air missions in the area, satellites, etc.)- This
reconnaissance information must be collected, processed (film developed, tapes read,
pilots debriefed, etc.), and sent to the central tactical air controlling agency, where it
must be combined with reports coming from other sectors of the front. At some point,
the number of targets being nominated for attack, will exceed the capacity of the system
and a process of elimination should organize the remaining targets by priority. This
determination typically involves such factors as the importance of a target in depth or
the time-urgency of an engaged target on the active battlefield.
Once the commander has coordinated all his incoming information and
determined his priorities, he can generate the tasking orders (commands) that set the
target-engagement phase in motion. The tasking order must take into account, in
addition to reconnaissanece/intelligence data, the state and availability of friendly
forces (number of aircraft and crews available, fuel and munitions stocks, support
assets needed and available, attrition rates, etc.). When the tasking order arrives at the
operational unit (for the SAF, this would be a fighter-bomber or bomber regiment), the
actual mission-planning can begin. It is possible that a "heads-up" warning might
come down to the reeiment earher, when it becomes obvious to the centralized tactical
air controlling agency that certain missions are highly probable. In this way, the "nuts
and bolts" of mission-planning can begin, even in the absence of known strike package
sizes, support aircraft authorizations, and time-on-target requirements. This entire
process, including the strike itself and the subsequent battle damage assessment, is
often designed into a 24-hour cycle.
Obviously, in the case of mobile targets, the reconnaissance-target engagement
cycle must be so compressed that the target does not move ver>' far from the location
of its original sighting before it is attacked. This compression requires that certain
targets receive "special handling" in the reporting process and that less senior
commanders be given enough discretion and lattitude to depart from the original plan
and attack fieeting "targets of opportunity." While these are universal characteristics
of the reconnaissance-target engagement cycle, they are precisely the sorts of things the
Soviets may be poor at doing.
The Soviets' bureaucracy-burdened society (including the militarv') is ill-equipped
to handle departures from the expected and the planned. Soviet command and control
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procedures, including attack planning, is quite rigid and has in the past allowed very
little flexibility. Its highly-specific preplanning, highly-centralized decision-making, and
high penalties for unauthorized deviations make very unlikely the effective and efficient
prosecution of a war as complex as is likely to be encountered in the NATO Central
region. ^^°
Quoting Soviet Lieutenant Colonel A. Zakharenko, Joshua Epstein cites Soviet
combined air-ground efforts, in which
"the results of air strikes aeainst the enemy were of no consequence to the
gunners. Their rounds often "struck the same areas that had iust previously been
worked from the air." Tellinelv, they add, 'the duplication did not stem from,any
desire to achieve the maximum possible suppression of the 'enemv,' but from
uncoordinated decisions .... Was this fire required? With what density? It's
difficult to say. We had no bomb damage assessment data available.
Epstein also notes "inefficiencies within the Soviets' system of processing and
distributing reconnaissance information. "^^^ He argues that "staff skills have failed to
keep up with the increased tempo of modern combat."^ ^^ Again citing Lt. Col.
Zakharenko, Epstein notes that
ground force "combined arms commanders don't have an in-depth knowledse of
aviation subunits and, in turn, aviators fan only judge the development oT the
ground battle in the most general terms."
Thus, the necessary coordination between Soviet air and ground components may be
sorely lacking.
These problems may be magnified with the adoption of the OMG and its concept
of employment. The OMG, to be effective, must engage in imaginative raiding and
must have a wide lattitude for its maneuver. As we have seen, however, the Soviets do
not typically raise a good crop of daring and imaginative commanders in peacetime.
To make matters worse for the Soviets, the OMG should operate in an area of
1 ^n
Strengthening Conventional Deterrence, p. 48.







: Lt. Col. " '^ '
'
977, p. 1.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 114. Citing A. Zakharenko,
The Lessons of Coordination," Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 August 1?
Epstein, Measuring Military Power, p. 117.
Epstein, Measuring Military Power, p. 118.
Epstein, Measuring Military Power, p. 120.
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undisputed air superiority. It may be able to do this only if it operates within the
corridors opened up by the Air Operation. ^^^ This, however, would make the OMG
easy to find, less maneuverable, and quite predictable.
As far as the Air Operation itself is concerned, it is by no means certain to be a
success. The Warsaw Pact offensive in general, and the Air Operation in particular, is
supposed to be a hightly-integrated, minutely-synchronized series of events "dependent
upon a constant fiow at a predetermined rate."-'^^ The Air Operation requires extreme
preplanning of launch and recovery times, ingress and egress routes, altitude and time
blocks, coordinated air defense and escort operations, and synchronized
times-on-target.^^^ If anything goes wrong or -happens unexpectedly, the Soviets may
not be sufficiently able to improvise. Marxist-Leninist "insights" and scientific
planning notwithstanding, von Clausewitz' "fog" and "friction of war" make combat
unpredictable.
B. AIR COMBAT
In the air combat arena, the Soviets have showTi themselves in the past to be
lacking in initiative and creativity. In fact, lack of initiative is a real problem in the
SAP, in which peacetime training is typcially routinized and unrealistic. ^^^ General
Lieutenant of Aviation G. Pavlov complains that "the pilots imitating the target fly
only in a straight line, without changing altitude or speed."^^^
"Soviet operational practices are surprisingly 'pro forma' with little continuing
ertbrt to enhance their skills under realistic conditions. Manv of their 'sorties
appear to be rather canned 'once around the flagpole and bac'k.' In sJmrt, they
appear to maintain their flying skills, but not their combat proficiency."
"Resouce limitations may well dictate that the corridor of air superiority
established for the conduct of the air operation must be coordinated with the air-cover
corridors created to protect the OMu's." Strengthening Conventional Deterrence, p.
I ^^
Strenthening Conventional Deterrence, p. 62.
1 R7
Jefirey S. Johnson, Initiative in Soviet Air Force Tactics and Decision Making,
(Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1986), p. 109.
^^^Johnson, Initiative, p. 97.
^^^Epstein, Measuring Military Power, p. 100, citing General Lieutenant of
Aviation G. Pavlov, 'Tnexhaustible Reserve," Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 August 1976, p. 2.
^^^Epstein, Measuring Militarv Power, p. 101, citine Edward T. Timperlake and
Steven Leveen. 'A Methoaoloev for Estimating Comparative Aircrew Proficiency." a
report prepared for the Theater "Forces Division, Office of Strategic Research. Central
Intelligence Agency (Arlington: The Analytic Sciences Corporation, 1981), pp. 7-25.
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Epstein goes on to quote the Directorate of Soviet Affairs, Air Force Intelligence
Service, as saying: "Pilots fly the same patterns over the same ranges year after year
and then perform poorly when conditions are varied ever so slightly."^^^ This lack of
initiative, hitherto characteristic of Soviet fighter pilots, is in "consonance with
well-known Soviet operational practice," in which "the Soviets place hea\7 stress on
the importance of GCI directives in shaping the contours of the [air] engagement. "^^^
Benjamin Lambeth points out that
for vears, going as far back as World War II, the Soviet Air Force has resisted
the "idea of allowine its pilots much independence and has instead, (pressed the
importance of maintaining close control over its fighters at all times.
Because the Soviets "routinely export their operational style along with their
arms transfers to client states," it is reasonable to look for clues to Soviet performance
in that of the Chinese (in the Korean War), the North Vietnamese, and the Syrians. ^^"^
In Korea, Chinese- and Soviet-flown MIG's typically had a thrust-to-weight ratio
advantage over the US F-86 Sabres; by maintaining maximum speed, the MIG pilots
retained their energy advantage and were able to fly with near impunity in the vertical
plane. In Vietnam, several "extenuating circumstances" led to multi-turn dogfights.
despite the seemingly large technological lead of the US F-4 Phantom over enemy
fighters. ^^^
^^^ Measuring Military Power, p. 102, citing Directorate of Soviet Affairs, Air
Force Intelligence'Service, Soviet Press Selected Translations, April 1977. p. 86.
^^^Benjamin S. Lambeth. "Moscow's Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War,"
a Project Air Force Report prepared for the United States Air Force (Santa Monica:
Rand, 1984), p. 1. "^ "^ "^
^^•^Lambeth, "Moscow's Lessons," p. 20.
Lambeth, "Moscow's Lessons," p. 29.
^^^"Durine the earlv vears of the Vietnam conflict the low-wing-loaded, low-T/W
[thrust-to-weiehl] MIG-r7'FRESCO opposed the US F-4 Phantom. With nearlv a
ten-year techhologv advantage, a powerful air-to-air radar, semi-active radar-guided
Sparrow missiles. RQ [rear quarter] head-seeking Sidewinders, and supersonic^ speed
capability, the Phantom might have been considered more than a match for the
subsonic' guns-only MIG- 17. Several extenuating circumstances, however, greatlv
altered the balance. The long-range, all-aspect Sparrow missile, for instance, often
could not be used, since it was usually impossible to identifv the target as. hostile
except visually at close range. Bv that time the MIG- 17 was probably inside the
weapon's minimum-range capabilities and tended to remain there during subsequent
maneuvering. Since this missile was not 'dogfight capable.' and the Phantoms
generally lacked gun armament, onlv the RQ Sidewinder remained viable against the
more maneuverable MIG. Even so", energy tactics should have allowed the F-4. to
escape or to remain neutrally engaged until the MIG pilot lost sight or had to retire.
Unfortunately for the Americans, the Phantom crews often were poorly trained in
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In more recent year, however, Syrian performance against the Israeli Air Force
(lAF) and the attendent Soviet analysis of those engagements may provide some
important clues as to the current state of Soviet air combat skills and preferences.
During the June 1982 air battles over Lebanon, the lAF jammed voice- and data-links
between Syrian aircraft and their GCI sites. ^^^ This caused the Syrians to lose "any
semblance of air discipline and [the Syrians] quickly became split up into isolated pairs
and singles."^^^ Lambeth goes on to say that "the Soviet Air Force currently operates
under a similar close-control doctrine and would be comparably vulnerable to enemy
jamming interference. "^^^ As we have seen, however, the Soviets are now receiving
"equipment that would allow it, in principle, to go well beyond that restrictive
operating doctrine. "^^^ Lambeth's analysis of the Soviets' lessons from the 1982 air
engagements suggests that while the Soviets may "have this problem increasingly in
mind," they nevertheless drew some fundamentally wrong conclusions from the combat,
particularly regarding the true threat from all-aspect missiles and the subsequent
requirements for their employment. These interpretations, Lambeth concludes, olTer
"ground for guarded encouragement among American fighter pilots."
C. TOWARD THE YEAR 2000
The technologies incorporated into the Soviets' new SU-27 FLANKER and
MIG-29 FULCRUM seem optimized not solely for the high-altitude, high-speed, BVR,
"single-pass shot" type of engagement, but also for the best possible performance in the
primary maneuver region (less than Mach 1.0 and 10,000-30,000 foot altitudes).-^^^ This
enerev techniques, were faced with a much smaller enemy aircraft that was hard to
traclT'visually, and sometimes lacked the combat endurance for extended engagements
far from their bases. These circumstances often led to hard-turnine engagements, to
the advantage of the MIG's. The MIG's also were generally blessed with better
ground-based radar control and could spot and identifv the Phantoms at lon§
distrances because the F-4 engines smoked badlv. Therefore, the MIG's often reached
a firing position, or at least" gained substanti'al advantage, before being detected."
Robert L. Shaw. Fighter Combat'. Tactics and Maneuvering (Annapolis: Naval





s Lessons," p. 6.
s Lessons," p. 9.
s Lessons," p. 21.
s Lessons," p. 20.
^^^Lambeth, "Moscow's Lessons," p. 27.
^^^In practice, high-Mach speeds are not verv useful in combat. They use up
fuel at enormous rates and severely restrict maneuve'rability. At high altitudes as well,
turning performance is limited.
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may reflect increasing Soviet interest in close maneuver combat.^^^ If this trend is as
strong as its proponents insist, it would represent a sharp departure from the recent
past, in which Soviet fighter pilots have typically been GCI-bound and notably lacking
in initiative. However, the new technologies incorporated into recent designs certainly
seem compatible with greater pilot autonomy in at least two respects. First, if the new
fighters (SU-27 FLANKER and MIG-29 FULCRUM) are indeed intended for
"intruder"-type missions beyond the FEBA, they will be operating outside of GCI
range. The pilots of these aircraft will then have no choice but to exercise a degree of
independent thinking not previously seen in the postwar Soviet Air Force. Second, the
close combat maneuvering that these aircraft make possible may also place unremitting
demands on pilot creativity and initiative. Finally, the histor>' of Korea and Vietnam
suggest that the Soviets are not incapable of maneuvering air combat.
General Lieutenant N. N. Ostroumov has written that in front-controlled
aviation, preference will be given to aerial engagements with enemy aircraft, while in
theater-controlled operations, preference will be given to attacking enemy aircraft on
their own airfields.-^^^ This distinction suggests that the long-range kill might be sought
in the course of escorting the air operation, perhaps in order to liniit the disruption to
the planned execution of that effort. Maneuvering engagements might be more likely
to take place after frontal aircraft had been released back to the subordinate commands
from which they had originally been requisitioned. This interpretation is supported by
Jeffrey Johnson's argument that the Air Operation (ground attack) commanders have
historically "stifled" the initiative that air superiority fighter pilots would like to
develop.-^^'^
It has been argued in any event, that if both sides are increasingly equipped with
long-range all-aspect missiles, then it is possible that air combat will not progress
beyond the initial head-on pass. A better explanation for incorporating both long- and
"Close maneuver combat . . . has been recognized by the Soviets and
increasing emphasis on independent tactics and pilot initiative is evident in recent
Soviet aviation publications. Rana Penning.ton, "Pilot Initiative in the Soviet Air
Forces," Murphy, The Soviet Air Forces, p. \:>2. The 1985 issue of the DOD's Soviet
Military Power/sa.ys that "since 1980. fundamental chan£es have occurred in Soviet
fighter tactics and trainina. The introduction of an air-to-air combat training program,
in'corporatine air combat"" in a visual environment against maneuvering targets, is a
significant step forward" {pp. 86-87).
^^^General Lieutenant of Aviation N. N. Ostroumov. cited in Phillip A. Petersen
and Major John R. Clark. "Soviet Air and Antiair Operations," Air Lniversitv Review,
March-April 1985, Vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 36-54.
Johnson, Initiative, p. 11.
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close-range kill mechanisms into modern Soviet fighters may simply lie in the expected
nature of a future war and the nature of tactical engagements. In the electromagnetic
environment likely to be encountered in the NATO Central Region, many of the
long-range systems on air combat fighters simply will not work. Second, even
off-boresight, all-aspect weapons have optimum launch envelopes. Thus, the aerial
engagement that otherwise might have evolved into a BVR "face shot" or a long-range,
ofT-boresight kill, may come to involve maneuvering into a shorter-range kill envelope
and "degenerating" into a classical "dogfight." This appears to be a scenario the
Soviets may be anticipating. In the past, NATO has typically had an advantage over
the Soviet Air Force in maneuvering in the vertical plane and fighting at higher
altitudes, where Soviet fighters could not mainatin their maneuver energy. However,
the Soviets have maneuvered in the past and appear increasingly interested in
challenging the current NATO superiority in that arena. They will attempt to do this
with new weapons, new tactics and new force employment concepts.
If the Soviets are able to overcome the institutional drag that has thus far
plagued their society and military', as well as fix the apparent shortcomings in their
reconnaissance-target engagement cycle; if they are able to flawlessly execute the Air
Operation, establishing their air superiority over NATO and eliminating NATO's
nuclear arsenal at the very outset of a war; if they are able to make the Operational
Maneuver Group concept and the new command and control arrangements work; and,
last but not least, if Soviet fighter pilots are able to ride a ver>' steep learning curve in
the first day or two of a European war and survive, then the Soviets may indeed win
the next war very quickly, without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. Until then,
however, even with new weapons and advanced technology, Soviet tactical air
superiority is as much an illusion as Icarus' unthinking disregard for the circumstances




The data base is described in the following manner: each entry contains the
name of a variable and what that variable measures or describes. In addition, some
entries contain further comments (type of data, ground rules, numerical derivations,
definitions, etc.).
AIRADAR: air intercept radar (l = yes, = no);
AIRSRCHAZ: air intercept radar search azimuth;
ARM: antiradiation missile ( 1 = yes, = no);
ASM', air-to-surface missile ( 1 = yes, = no);
ASPECT: wing aspect ratio (wingspan squared divided by wing area);
CALIBER: caliber of largest gun;
CEILING: combat ceiling;
CHORD: wing thickness to chord ratio;
CLIMBRATE: aircraft rate of climb;
CRADIUS: combat radius (for air combat, subsonic area intercept; for ground attack,
HI-LO-HI and 50% ordnance)
DESIGNYEAR: year of aircraft design;
DIGDATALINK: digital data link (l = yes, = no);
DOPPNA V: doppler navigation ( 1 = yes, = no);
ECHELON: depth of responsibility of command echelon to which aircraft is assigned
(front = 160nm, ADD = 608nm, theater = 270nm)
ECM: electronic countermeasures (1 = yes, 0= no)
EMPTYWGT: aircraft empty weight;
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ENDURE: endurance (time aircraft can remain aloft in combat configuration);
ENGINES: number of engines;
ENGINETYPE: type of engines (engine make and model number);
EXFUEL: external fuel capacity;
FIRSTFLT: year of aircraft's first flight;
FUELFRAC: fuel fraction (fraction of maximum weight taken up by full fuel load);
GARADAR: ground attack radar (1 = yes, 0= no);
GLIMIT: aircraft G-limit;
GROUNDRUN: takeoff ground run (distance in feet aircraft in combat configuration
requires for takeoff)
GUNS: number of guns on aircraft;
HUD: head-up-display ( 1 = yes, = no);
INFUEL: internal fuel capacity;
INNA V: inertial navigation ( 1 = yes, = no);
IOC: initial operational capability (year of IOC);
IRSTS: infrared search and track system (1 = yes, 0= no);
LASDES: laser designator ( 1 = yes, = no);
LASRANGE: laser ranging device (1 = yes, = no);
LDSD: lookdown/shootdown capability (1 = yes, = no);
LED: lift-enhancing devices ( 1 = yes, = no);
MACHSL: maximum sea-level airspeed (MACH);
MANEUVER: maneuverability [ratio of TWRATIO to combat wingloading (combat
weight divided by wing area)]
MAXPOWER: maximum engine thrust;
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MILPOIVER: maximum non-afterburning engine thrust;
MSLRANGE: maximum air-to-air missile (AAM) range (for radar-guided AAM's,
high-altitude, head-on, fighter-size target; for infrared-guided AAM's, look-up,
tail-aspect, fighter-size target)
NUMBERMSLS: maximum number of AAM's;
OKBCODE: design bureau code (1 = MIG, 2= SUKHOI);
ORDNANCE: maximum weight of ground attack ordnance, or air-to-air weapons,
whichever is greater
PERIOD: period of aircraft's design (1 = 1945-1953, 2= 1954-1964, 3= 1964-1973,
4=1973-1985)
RECCE: reconnaissance capability (photographic, SLAR, infrared, electronic;
1 = yes, = no)
R WR: radar warning receiver ( 1 = yes, = no);
SEARCH: air intercept radar search range;
SPANLOAD: spanloading (combat weight divided by wingspan);
STALLSPD: aircraft stall speed;
STATIONS: number of weapons pylons on aircraft;
TERRA VOID: terrain avoidance radar ( 1 = yes, = no);
TERRFOLL: terrain following radar ( 1 = yes, = no);
TOTALFUEL: total fuel capacity;
TRACK: air intercept radar track range;
TRACKSCN: track-while-scan radar ( 1 = yes, = no);
TWRA TIO: thrust-to-weight ratio [maximum afterburning thrust divided by combat
weight (50% fuel, 100% weapons)]
VG W: variable-geometry wing ( 1 = yes, = no);
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WINGLOAD: wingloading (combat weight divided by wing area);
WINGSWEEP'. wingsweep (sweep of wing leading edge).
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The aircraft that comprised the data base were the following:
MlG-15 FAGOT (A), MIG-15 FAGOT{B)
MIG-17 FRESCO A, MIG-17 FRESCO B, MIG-17 FRESCO C,
MIG-17 FRESCO D, MIG-17 FRESCO E
MIG-19 FARMER A, MIG-19 FARMER B, MIG-19 FARMER C,
MrG-19 FARMER D, MIG-19 FARMER E
MIG-21 FISHBED A, MIG-21F FISHBED C, MIG-21PF FISHBED D,
MIG-21PFM FISHBED F, MIG-21R FISHBED H, MIG-21MF FISHBED J,
MIG-21SMT FISHBED K, MIG-21bis FISHBED L, MIG-21bisF FISHBED N
MIG-23 FLOGGER A, MIG-23M FLOGGER B, MIG-23MF FLOGGER G
MIG-27BM FLOGGER D, MIG-27BN FLOGGER J
MIG-25 FOXBAT A, MIG-25R FOXBAT B/D, MIG-25M FOXBAT E
MIG-29 FULCRUM
MIG-31 FOXHOUND
SU-7B FITTER A, SU-7BM FITTER B, SU-7BKL FITTER B
SU-9 FISHPOT B
SU-11 FISHPOT C
SU-15 FLAGON A, SU-15 FLAGON D, SU-15 FLAGON E, SU-15 FLAGON F
SU-17 FITTER C, SU-17 FITTER D, SU-17 FITERR H, SU-17 FITTER K










18% air defense district
MIG-25 FOXBAT A/E:
30% front













30% air defense district
40% front
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For example, the calculations to determine the DEPTHRATIO value for the
MIG-29 FULCRUM were as follows:
30% X 270nm (weighting factor x theater depth)
30% X 608nm (weighting factor x ADD depth)
40% X 160nm (weighting factor x front depth)
327nm = ECHELON value
DEPTHRATIO = CRADIUS/ECHELON
DEPTHRATIO = 620/327= 1.89 = MIG-29 FULCRUM DEPTHRATIO
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